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EVIDENCE-BASED LITIGATION REFORM
Mark Spottswood*
I. INTRODUCTION
When we seek to assess the impact of existing rules of legal procedure
or propose improvements to them, we are faced with stubborn questions
defying easy answers. Who will benefit from a new rule? Who might be
harmed? Will the rule cost more, or add delay to the resolution of cases?
And perhaps most importantly, will the legal system as a whole become
more just or fair if the rule is adopted?
When trying to answer such questions, we encounter a poverty of useful
data. We can rely on our intuitions and theoretic understandings to choose
between possible rules, but history is littered with examples of wellintentioned rule reform that led to effects drastically different from what
rule designers imagined.1 For instance, when the enactors of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure added summary judgment and fact discovery to
the litigation toolkit, they failed to envision the future they were creating, in
which discovery became the most time-intensive aspect of litigation
practice and summary judgment disposed of more cases than trials did.2
Their failure to anticipate these things is not unusual, and it should not be
surprising. The litigation system is vastly complex, and how it will change
in response to a new rule depends on obscure interactions between a new
rule, the background matrix of existing rules and practices, the preferences
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1
See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 455, 484–89 (1993) (describing the intuitive, theory-driven approach that has dominated civil rule
making); Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1121–22, 1197 (2002) (noting that until very recently, rule makers have
rarely looked to empirical research to support their conclusions, and that even in recent times most of the
studies they employed were of limited utility for answering questions about the causal impact of rules).
2
See generally discussion infra Part III.
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of the many players involved, and their strategic adaptations and counteradaptations to new realities.3
A number of other disciplines face similar design challenges. It is also
hard to predict how the human body will react to a new drug, how a change
in a product’s design or manufacture will impact its reliability or safety, or
how well a new regulatory policy will achieve the goals of its designers.
At times policymakers in these other fields have relied on their intuitive
understanding of how a system works to make inferences about the results
of a new intervention. Sometimes this may go very well, but it might also
go disastrously wrong.
To take just one chilling example, note the long-standing use of
bloodletting as a therapeutic tool in medicine.4 Therapeutic exsanguination
persisted for millennia before a few enterprising physicians decided to test
the theory that it improved health outcomes.5 It turned out, of course, that it
was bad for most patients to be bled, but this was not obvious before the
systematic collection of data.6 Looking at individual case anecdotes in the
absence of controlled experiments, it was simply impossible to tell whether
practices like bloodletting were saving lives or not. The rise of the more
effective medicine we now enjoy was driven by a turn to evidence-based
evaluation of both disease theory and therapeutic effectiveness, and could
not have occurred absent a willingness to conduct controlled experiments as
a means of identifying which therapies work and which ones do not.7 More
recently, the evidence-based medicine movement has offered strong
arguments that medical care could be further improved if doctors depended
more on experimental verification of treatments and less on intuition.8
Unfortunately, given our present methods of evaluating procedural
success, we have little cause to be confident that our existing legal rules

3

See Ronald J. Allen, Taming Complexity: Rationality, the Law of Evidence, and the Nature of the
Legal System 16–17 (Thirteenth Int’l Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence & Evidential Inference, Working Paper No. 11-52, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1845817. Allen describes the litigation environment
as a “complex adaptive system with emergent properties” that are unpredictable from the underlying
structure, in which long-term equilibria develop out of innumerable interactive choices by individual
decision makers. Id. at 17. Such chaotic systems tend to resist reliable prediction. Id.
4
See Edward Shorter, Primary Care, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 103, 109 (Roy
Porter ed., 2006).
5
See id. at 108–10.
6
See id.; see also M. WEATHERALL, IN SEARCH OF A CURE: A HISTORY OF PHARMACEUTICAL
DISCOVERY 16 (1990).
7
See generally discussion infra Part II.
8
Cf. Jeffrey A. Claridge & Timothy C. Fabian, History and Development of Evidence-Based
Medicine, 29 WORLD J. SURGERY 547, 547 (2005).
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work any better than bleeding and purging a sick patient. Like medieval
doctors, we watch the patient (that is, individual cases) with some care, but
we rarely try to systematically measure the differential effects of competing
rules on case outcomes. What is worse, even when we do try to measure
the effects of procedural rules, our investigations routinely neglect to
measure the impact of a rule on the accuracy of case outcomes when we
attempt to evaluate its effectiveness. This problem is a grave one.
Outcome accuracy—meaning a correspondence between the factual
understandings that motivate legal decision makers and the historical facts
that gave rise to litigation—is among the most important values that we try
to optimize through procedural rules.9 But because we have never tried to
systematically measure the accuracy of case outcomes, our ability to
estimate the accuracy of civil and criminal case outcomes is severely
limited.
Some may object that outcome accuracy is something that cannot be
measured effectively,10 but this is not the case. In order to measure the
accuracy of case outcomes in general, we must first parse the concept of
accuracy into a measurable form, and then create “gold standard” methods
for assessing it. I propose one potential measurement protocol in this
Article that might be able to allow some systematic measurement of factual
accuracy in procedural outcomes, while acknowledging that this solution
would be costly to implement on a large scale. In brief, this protocol entails
obtaining a record of what facts motivate those who are responsible for
producing legal outcomes, and then comparing those beliefs with the results
of a more detailed, in-depth investigation into the factual background of a
case. This protocol could be implemented on a relatively small scale if
researchers are interested in particular questions regarding procedural
validity, but it could also be scaled up as a basis for inter-systemic
comparisons.
Although it might seem that such investigations would be second best
to the outcome of a trial on the merits, this objection turns out to be less
weighty than it seems, because the vast majority of cases are either settled
or decided on a pretrial motion.11 We have good reason to worry that in

9

See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183–85 (2004).
Cf. Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture’s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational Versus
Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (noting, for one
example, that most think of DNA evidence as a “gold standard” means of assessing verdict accuracy, but
that it is available and dispositive in only a small percentage of criminal cases).
11
See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161,
161–64 (1986).
10
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many such cases, key decision makers know only a fraction of the
information that a jury trial might produce.12 Nor is it fatal to an evidencebased litigation reform project that many cases involve fundamentally
ambiguous records or “he said, she said” credibility disputes.13 A proper
system for measuring outcome accuracy should be able to separately
categorize those cases that the legal system viewed as close, and if legal
decision makers and gold standard reference investigators agree that cases
involve difficult ambiguities, then the legal decisions can be said to be just
as accurate as when investigators and decision makers agree that a case has
only one clearly correct outcome. But such an investigation would also
help reveal when cases appear ambiguous only because insufficient
investigation has been performed, or when cases are thought to have clear
right answers only because complicating evidence has been ignored.
Unless and until we investigate the ways that our existing procedural
devices affect outcome accuracy, we should have little confidence that any
of our procedures are particularly effective ways of generating factually
valid legal results at acceptable cost. Although a few scholars, following
Charles Nesson, might wish to ignore evidence about our system’s accuracy
if it undermines public confidence in verdicts,14 more will think that we
should attend to both the system’s accuracy and its legitimacy when
designing rules.15 Nor is the problem of inaccurate outcomes of merely
theoretic interest. Inaccurate outcomes involve chilling social costs: some
people go to jail for crimes they did not commit, some are forced to pay
others for wrongs they did not cause, and some who deserve punishment or
sanction evade it. Every so often, we get a brief window into the defects in
our procedures. A prominent recent example, from the criminal procedure
arena, was the rise of DNA evidence. Suddenly, a new forensic technique
showed that many “ordinary” criminal convictions, which had seemed as
reliable as most other case outcomes, were factually invalid.16 But since we

12
See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 816–17
(2011) (describing the practice norms of many settlement-focused law firms, in which there is little
attorney-client contact or attorney investigation into case facts).
13
Cf. Alex Stein, An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with Special
Reference to Contract Cases, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 300 (1998) (explaining that fact-finding
inherently involves unknowable uncertainty, due to the frequent situation of “evidential scarcity” that
bedevils real-world litigation).
14
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358–59 (1985).
15
See discussion infra Part III.B.
16
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG 1–13 (2011); Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 70 (2003) (noting
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rarely get such insight into the validity of case outcomes, the real harms of
inaccurate resolutions are mostly hidden from our sight.
In this Article, I attempt to show the need for investigations into the
causal effects of procedural rules on the accuracy of case outcomes.
Drawing on examples from the medical literature, I sketch out what would
be involved in trying to measure the impact of various procedural rules on
the accuracy of case outcomes. Although such research could, for the first
time, enable us to identify which procedures succeed at resolving cases
accurately and which do not, it would also be expensive and difficult.
Nevertheless, if we value accurate litigation outcomes a great deal, we
might wish to bear these burdens, as we already do in the name of
protecting our health.
After imagining what a more evidence-based world of procedural
design might require, I then turn to consider what we might learn about
existing procedural debates and problems by comparing current practice to
that idealized approach. One sobering implication is that the existing
empirical literature on litigation rules may have less to teach us than we
might hope. So long as we fail to measure accuracy, information about the
variables we can track cannot provide a strong platform on which to base
rule-design decisions, because we can never be sure that improvements in
other procedural values are not coming at the expense of the system’s
accuracy.
At the same time, this discussion has important implications for those
with the power to make new rules, even if they are unwilling to do the hard
work needed to systematically test the accuracy effects of existing
procedures. In particular, I urge that rules be made in a way that both
allows continuing evaluation of comparative data and that incorporates as
wide a spectrum of on-the-ground experience as possible. On the spectrum
of possibilities, this means that the best rules will be those tested out first on
a local level and then made broadly applicable through the formal rule
making process. Conversely, rules established by constitutional mandate
from high-level courts will tend to be under-informed and will stifle our
ability to test the premises that prompted their announcement.
This Article will proceed in five parts. First, I will discuss the rise of an
evidence-based research culture in Western medicine in order to highlight
some of the lessons that legal reformers can learn both from its successes
and from its continuing struggles. Second, I will make the case for why an
evidence-based approach could be a valuable change to the way that
that “[u]ntil the moment when the DNA test results came back, almost none of these cases [in which
DNA evidence revealed that a conviction was in error] would have been considered exceptional among
criminal cases”).
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juridical procedures are designed, and why existing attempts at data
collection fall short of being able to facilitate such an approach. In this
discussion, I will draw primarily on examples in civil procedure, although
similar observations could be applied to rule design in criminal procedure
or evidence. Third, I will address the difficulties that such a movement will
face, with particular emphasis on the importance of developing a gold
standard baseline for assessing the accuracy of case outcomes. Fourth, I
will discuss a research design that might address these problems and make
systematic accuracy measurement an achievable possibility. Finally, I will
discuss some of the smaller steps we could take towards evidence-based
litigation reform.
II. THE BENEFITS OF EVIDENCE-DRIVEN DESIGN: THE MEDICAL EXAMPLE
Before discussing the problems I see in existing approaches to
evaluating the impacts of rules of legal procedure, I will first take a detour
into the history of medical innovation and practice, with a special focus on
the gains that doctors have achieved by systematically measuring the effects
of potential treatments on health outcomes. This discussion will have
several payoffs for scholars of procedural reform. First, the world of
medieval medicine illustrates the dark side of relying on intuition and
theory alone when evaluating how successful a treatment is. In that time
and place, doctors did an extraordinary amount of harm to patients, despite
having good intentions, because it was impossible to assess whether a
treatment was helping or hurting on a case-by-case basis. This story has
disturbing implications regarding the extent to which modern legal
procedures achieve high levels of case accuracy, an outcome that goes
similarly untested in our modern world.
Next, I will describe how doctors were able to substantially improve the
quality of patient care through a centuries-long effort to develop more
accurate biological theories and to test the effect of possible treatments
using controlled trials. This example offers a potential source of inspiration
to legal reformers. Perhaps, if we were willing to invest resources on a
similar scale with the goal of developing a measurably accurate procedural
system, we could find similar success in improving the quality of justice.
Finally, I will discuss modern methods of medical testing, with special
emphasis on the FDA-mandated system of pharmaceutical drug testing and
the recent reform efforts of the evidence-based medicine movement. By
surveying these modern approaches, we can find sources of guidance for
how legal procedures could be similarly evaluated. In particular, the
evidence-based medicine movement has offered insights into the best
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means of evaluating the efficacy of diagnostic tests, and this model
provides a worthy example for procedural reformers to emulate. We will
also see, however, that implementing such procedures would require a
willingness to invest sizeable amounts of time and money in improving the
quality of justice, and that the approach can lose much of its value if it
becomes politicized or captured by special interests.
A. Medicine Before the Rise of Systematic Effectiveness Testing
The phrase “evidence-based medicine” may be new,17 but people have
long been interested in curing disease and increasing physical health.
Although there are a few intriguing early examples of medical
experiments,18 for a very long time medical practice doctors relied primarily
on ancient authoritative texts and theoretical understandings of disease
processes to choose treatments for the sick, supplemented by various forms
of faith healing and folk medicine.19 Throughout much of Western history,
medicine was a mixed bag; it offered some surprisingly effective treatments
for a few conditions,20 but had little to offer for some of the most common
medical challenges of the day, such as the often fatal process of childbirth,
and favored the routine use of actively harmful procedures like bleeding
and purging.21
It would be a mistake to think that doctors relied on such methods
because they were uninterested in curing patients. Rather, they lacked the
means by which to differentiate between good and bad treatments, and so
tended to defer to ancient authorities to guide their decisions.22 In the

17

See Claridge & Fabian, supra note 8, at 547 (tracing the origin of the term to the mid-1990s).
See, e.g., Daniel 1:1-16 (relating a dietary experiment proposed by Daniel and implemented by
his guards); Christian Gluud et al., Commentary on the Ben Cao Tu Jing (Atlas of Materia Medica),
JAMES LIND LIB. (2003), http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/illustrating/articles/commentary-on-the-bencao-tu-jing-11th-century-atlas-of-mater.pdf. Also notable among early medical practitioners were the
Empiricists, a sect of ancient Greek physicians who eschewed the fanciful anatomical theories of the
day, preferring to prescribe treatments by analogy to prior successful interventions rather than based on
theoretic understandings of human disease processes. See Vivian Nutton, The Rise of Medicine, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 53.
19
See generally Claridge & Fabian, supra note 8, at 547; Nutton, supra note 18, at 54–64 (relating
how, for a long time after Galen, most medical writers devoted themselves primarily to collecting and
restating past medical wisdom rather than challenging it).
20
See Nutton, supra note 18, at 66. One historian lists medieval treatments for abdominal injuries,
hernias, anal fistulae, bladder stones, and cataracts as particularly effective. Id.
21
Id. at 68.
22
Perhaps the most influential authority was Galen of Pergamum, a Roman physician and
philosopher who went to great lengths to synthesize the medical literatures of antiquity with his own
investigations into anatomy, which he based primarily on dissections of pigs and monkeys. Galen was
18
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dominant paradigm, which dated back to Hippocrates, the body contained
four “humors”—phlegm, red or yellow bile, black bile, and blood—and
disease occurred when the balance between these humors was disturbed or
when they were contaminated by toxins.23
Many popular medical treatments attempted to balance the humors or
rid the body of toxins by draining it of fluids that were believed to be
contaminated.24 To accomplish this, physicians engaged in bloodletting,
heaped blankets on feverish patients to make them sweat, gave them
emetics to make them vomit, and purged their intestines with powerful
laxatives.25 Even worse, the compounds used to open patients’ bowels were
often highly toxic substances.26 Some herbal remedies were also employed
to help balance the humors, but such remedies were mixed together in
complex formulations so that the body could “select[] whatever ingredient
would correct the humoral imbalance.”27 In short, in order to improve the
health of their patients, doctors systematically made them “anaemic through
bloodletting, deplet[ed them] . . . of fluids and valuable electrolytes via the
stool, and poison[ed them] . . . with compounds of such heavy metals as
mercury and lead.”28
It is easy to look back on such a calamity and think that it must have
been obvious that such procedures were a terrible idea, but it was not so. In
the world to which traditional medicine applied, many diseases were
frequently fatal, with or without the addition of medical treatment.29 In any
individual case, it would be impossible to tell whether a death occurred
because of a heroic treatment or in spite of it. Moreover, there were
certainly many anecdotes that a doctor could point to in support of such
theories. Thanks to our immune systems, people often recover from disease
and other calamities without medical intervention, and with a strong enough
constitution recovery could no doubt follow even a stringent regime of
forced to rely on animal studies due to the Roman ban on the dissection of human cadavers. The basic
understanding of disease processes and therapeutic treatment he set out endured for millennia. See id. at
54–55; Roy Porter, What Is Disease?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 80;
Shorter, supra note 4, at 103.
23
See generally Shorter, supra note 4, at 103–04; Miles Weatherall, Drug Treatment and the Rise
of Pharmacology, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 214.
24
See Shorter, supra note 4, at 104–05.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 108.
27
WALTER SNEADER, DRUG DISCOVERY: A HISTORY 22 (2005).
28
Shorter, supra note 4, at 109. Given the content of traditional “heroic medicine,” it is perhaps
unsurprising that some developed a dread of doctoring; indeed, Joseph Addison commented in 1711 that
“when a nation abounds in physicians, it grows thin of people.” Id. (quoting 1 THE SPECTATOR IN FOUR
VOLUMES 64–65 (1945)).
29
See L. Cilliers, Where Were the Doctors When the Roman Empire Died?, 26 ACTA THEOLOGICA
SUPPLEMENTUM 62, 75 (2006).
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bleeding, blistering, and purging.30 And in some cases, these therapies may
even have helped patients feel better, thanks to the power of the placebo
effect.31 A patient’s belief that a particular cure will be beneficial can have
therapeutic effects even where the treatment itself is biochemically useless,
and many patients believed powerfully that traditional medicine could cure
them.32 Indeed, some patients attributed their healing to truly awful medical
interventions.33 So, despite its horrors, traditional medicine seemed
plausible enough during the long stretch of history to which it applied, and
continued to be demanded by patients even as doctors began to lose faith in
it.34 The example of medieval medicine shows us that well-meaning
professionals can do great harm to the people they are trying to help by
depending on conventional wisdom and theories to choose their treatments
if those theories do not rest on a firm and tested foundation. This example
should be sobering for those who would reform legal procedures, given that
our existing procedural toolkit has been subject to only limited testing.
B. Sowing the Seeds of Doubt
Two early reformers, Paracelsus35 and Vesalius,36 took the first steps
towards making medicine testable.37 Although he had many other odd
notions, Paracelsus pioneered the idea of using purified, specific
compounds as remedies rather than the complex blends of herbs known as

30
See DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH
EBM 150–51 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that when observing a single patient’s case, it can be difficult to
distinguish true effects of treatment from natural healing processes or placebo effects).
31
See Porter, supra note 22, at 83.
32
See Shorter, supra note 4, at 104.
33
See id. at 105. One particularly telling anecdote involves a German patient in the early
nineteenth century who was “weak, losing weight, and unable to rise from bed.” Id. The doctor sent
along a mild placebo of sweet syrup, but ants colonized the vial when the messenger took a rest break on
his way to the house. Id. The peasant later received the doctor looking quite recovered, and credited his
recovery to the powerful vomiting that the “really tough medicine” had induced. Id.
34
Id.
35
See SNEADER, supra note 27, at 41. Born in Switzerland in the late fifteenth century, Paracelsus
attended medical school but came to reject the ancient approaches favored by doctors of his day. Id. He
famously burned Galenic books, seeking instead to develop his own version of medical science; he
studied folk remedies, conducted chemical experiments, and invented a variety of chemical and mineral
cures. Id.; Weatherall, supra note 23, at 213–14. Some of his ideas were heavily influenced by alchemy
and astrology, and some of his cures consisted of toxic doses of heavy metals, but he also managed to
propose the idea that living beings require air to live and to introduce the use of laudanum, an opioid
tincture, for the treatment of pain. See SNEADER, supra, at 42; Weatherall, supra, at 213–14.
36
See generally Walter Pagel & Pyarali Rattansi, Vesalius and Paracelsus, in MEDICAL HISTORY
309, 309–28 (F.N.L. Poynter ed., 1964) (discussing the life of Vesalius).
37
Id. at 320.
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“galenicals.”38 Ultimately, this would enable physicians to measure the
impact of specific pharmaceutical compounds on patient health. Vesalius
explored the details of human anatomy by means of extensive dissection of
cadavers.39 He catalogued more than two hundred errors in Galen’s
anatomical descriptions, including Galen’s claims that venous blood
originated in the liver and his poor understanding of the movement of blood
through the human heart and lungs.40 By both casting strong doubt on
received authority regarding effective treatments and by proposing that
“knowledge of the true anatomy . . . was only to be gained by dissection
and close examination of the parts of the human body,” Vesalius and
Paracelsus planted the seeds for an empirical and experimental turn in
medicine.41
Vesalius’s work inspired a close attention to anatomical detail that
enabled many advances, as anatomists across Europe elaborated much that
had been mysterious about the shape and functioning of the circulatory,
pulmonary, digestive, nervous, and reproductive systems.42 A better
understanding of the body’s mechanics made it increasingly hard to make
sense of its functioning in terms of humoral balance.43 But to probe the
body’s deeper biological secrets, a broader set of tools was needed. Some
researchers explored the realm of the very small, developing increasingly
effective microscopes by which to elucidate the fine detail of living tissues,
and eventually developing the cell model of biological systems and the
roles of bacteria and parasites in causing diseases.44
Other important techniques and inventions enabled clinicians to expand
their observations into the interior of the body. Doctors learned to listen to
the inner workings of the body, first by percussing the chest to hear the
special sounds of pulmonary disease, and later by employing the newly
developed stethoscope to hear “the movement of blood, gas, and air within
the limbs and major body cavities.”45 By the end of the 1800s, doctors were
using X-ray technology to see what had previously been hidden behind the
skin of their patients,46 and using sensors to monitor the electrical activity

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Compare SNEADER, supra note 27, at 22, with Pagel & Rattansi, supra note 36, at 42.
See Pagel & Rattansi, supra note 36, at 319.
Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 325.
See SNEADER, supra note 27, at 74; Porter, supra note 22, at 138.
See Porter, supra note 22, at 138–39.
See id. at 141, 159–60. See generally GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 286–88

(1958).
45
46

Shorter, supra note 4, at 113. See generally Porter, supra note 22, at 153.
Stanley Joel Reiser, The Science of Diagnosis: Diagnostic Technology, in 2 COMPANION
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of the heart.47 These new disciplines, which incorporated knowledge drawn
from physics and chemistry into the medical toolkit, enabled doctors to
understand in far better detail the specific course of diseases in the body.
But observation and theorizing alone probably could not have swept
aside the practices of ancient medicine. It was also necessary to show that
the new theories could make a practical difference in treating patients.
Unfortunately, for some time it was much easier to show what did not work
than what did. As the mathematics of statistical analysis was coming of age
during the 1700s, doctors began to track the results of larger numbers of
cases to evaluate potential therapies instead of relying on single case
histories as their unit of analysis.48 Such methods soon showed the defects
in common therapies. In 1835, Pierre Louis published his Recherches sur
les Effets de la Saigneé, which reported his comparisons of matched pairs of
patients with similar histories and conditions, some of whom received
traditional therapies like bloodletting and emetics, while others did not.49
He found that traditional therapies offered little to no therapeutic benefit for
patients suffering from pneumonia or other diseases.50 Increasingly, the old
humoral ideas about treatment became increasingly unsupportable, as their
theories could not be squared with internal anatomy and their treatment
recommendations turned out to be ineffective when subjected to statistical
analysis.
C. Developing Scientifically Valid Foundations for Medical Practice
Happily for us, the power of experimentation did more than just show
us what not to do; when coupled with sustained inquiry and attempts to
innovate new treatments, experimental methods allowed medicine to finally
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 826, 839–40 (W.F. Bynum & Roy Porter eds., 1993).
The spread of this technology in particular was extraordinarily rapid. Id. at 840. One professor of
surgery commented, just two years after the discovery of X-ray imaging, that “[p]roper surgery cannot
be done in a certain variety of diseases without first using the X-ray.” Id. at 840.
47
Roy Porter, Hospitals and Surgery, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at
208.
48
W.F. BYNUM, SCIENCE AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 42–44
(1994). In one early study, James Lind grouped together twelve scurvy patients in 1747 and compared
the effects of six potential therapies, concluding that citrus fruit was the most effective in treating this
disease, which was widespread among seamen. Id. at 42–43; Claridge & Fabian, supra note 8, at 549.
Lind and others encouraged the systematic reporting of case histories, so that similar analyses could be
conducted with respect to other diseases, and hospitals increasingly complied. BYNUM, supra, at 42–43.
49
See PIERRE LOUIS, RECHERCHES SUR LES EFFETS DE LA SAIGNEÉ 7 (1835).
50
BYNUM, supra note 48, at 43–44. Louis’s decision to publish these results no doubt required a
fair bit of bravery, given that his teacher, François Joseph Victor Broussais, was both a leader of the
Paris school and a passionate advocate of “letting blood through leeching for virtually all diseases.” Id.
at 44; Harold J. Cook, Physical Methods, in 2 COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF
MEDICINE, supra note 46, at 950.
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start accumulating treatments that were known to be effective. Even a
summary of the major innovations in medicine would take far more space
than a law article can afford, but a few highlights should help us recognize
some of the ingredients that were crucial to the ultimate success of
evidence-based medical treatment design.
Some medical innovations turned out to be beneficial even though they
were based on faulty biological theories. One notable example is the
asepsis revolution in surgery and wound care.51 For a long time, surgery
was an extraordinarily risky proposition; patients risked succumbing to
shock from the great pain involved, and wounds almost inevitably became
infected, frequently leading to fatal sepsis.52 The identification and use of
anesthetic agents helped to solve the first dilemma, while the second was
much improved by attempts to improve hospital hygiene.53 Interestingly,
however, reforms aimed at improving the sanitary conditions of hospitals
significantly predated the microbiological theories that justify antiseptic
methods for preventing infection.54 Rather, early reformers noted a
connection between many diseases and the “filthy conditions and closed
contaminated atmospheres” that prevailed not only in prisons and slums,
but also within the hospitals of the period.55 This fell in line with a popular
disease theory of the time, which held that the miasmatic gases one
encountered in squalid conditions caused many diseases.56 Campaigns to
make hospitals cleaner and better ventilated therefore predated the scientific
understanding of bacterial infection by almost a hundred years.57
Sometimes, in other words, one can stumble on efficacious ideas by
accident. 58
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ROSEN, supra note 44, at 315–16.
Id. at 315.
53
See id. at 317–19.
54
Id. at 319.
55
Dorothy Porter, Public Health, in 2 COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE,
supra note 46, at 1235–36; Porter, supra note 47, at 189.
56
Porter, supra note 55, at 1236.
57
Compare Porter, supra note 55, with ROSEN, supra note 44, at 319.
58
A similar example can be found in smallpox inoculation, an effective immunological program
that predated an understanding of basic immunological concepts by nearly a century. Early inoculation
efforts took place in the mid-1700s, based on the observation that those who had previously survived the
disease were resistant to new infections. Before long, a less dangerous inoculation was made available
by Edward Jenner, who observed that milkmaids who had been exposed to cowpox also developed a
resistance to smallpox. See Kenneth Kiple, The History of Disease, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 33. The relationship between inoculation and the body’s production of
antibodies was not understood until the late 1800s. See generally Paul Weindling, The Immunological
Tradition, in 1 COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 46, at 192–95.
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More often, however, the identification of useful treatment methods
will require both sustained development of underlying theories and the
willingness to try many different means of achieving the desired result. The
history of antibiotic development, surely one of the greatest triumphs of the
evidence revolution in medicine, provides an instructive example.
Detecting bacteria and understanding how they were transmitted and how
they led to diseases required an extensive research program.59 Important
advances depended on Louis Pasteur’s work on the chemistry of optically
asymmetric organic compounds, which enabled him to detect the existence
of biological activity in the fermenting of beer and wine.60 This realization
led to his subsequent studies of how such activity could be controlled and of
how microbes can be transmitted through the air.61 The ultimate detection
of many microbes depended on the development of special chemical dyes
that could be used to stain and then visualize them using newly developed
microscopes.62 Robert Koch’s studies of infected mice were later critical to
establishing the life cycle of bacteria in a living host.63 Finally, the
development of effective chemical antibiotics depended on a great deal of
observational study of various conditions that inhibited bacterial growth,
such as the proximity of certain fungi, as well as an exhaustive process of
trial and error with a wide variety of chemical compounds.64 All in all, it
was more than eighty years from the date Pasteur first discovered anaerobic
bacteria until generally effective antibiotic treatments began to be available
on the mass market in the late 1930s.65
D. Evidence-Based Medicine in the Modern Age
Despite the advances described above, many medical challenges persist.
Cancers, cardiac ailments, and other diseases of the long-lived and wellnourished remain to trouble the medical establishment, while the
evolutionary process assures that some old diseases will occasionally
become resistant to existing therapies and rise again to trouble us.66 By
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See generally ROSEN, supra note 44, at 280–91.
Id. at 305–06.
Id. at 307.
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Id. at 312–13.
63
Id. at 311–12.
64
See generally SNEADER, supra note 27, at 287–313. See also WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at
149–54, 170–82.
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See generally Chronology, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 351–55.
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See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-H-629, IMPACTS OF ANTIBIOTICRESISTANT BACTERIA 1 (1995), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_1/DATA/1995/
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observing the struggles that medicine continues to face as well as its
obvious achievements, we can learn much about what a similar movement
in the legal world can expect.
Several features of modern medical practice are particularly noteworthy. First, the search for new treatments involves inevitable tradeoffs
between protecting the safety of existing patients and learning how to better
treat future ones.67 Second, many effective therapies would never have
come into existence absent the very costly searches and testing conducted
by for-profit entities with financial incentives to investigate many possible
therapies.68 Third, although attention to the minutiae of biological
processes has brought many benefits, modern clinicians have recently made
a strong case for experimental protocols that go beyond testing the effects
of medicine on immediate biophysical markers by measuring medicine’s
impact on overall health as well.69 This shift of attention from measuring
surrogate outcomes to ultimate outcomes has allowed researchers to
demonstrate that many popular treatments and diagnostic techniques
actually do more harm than good.70 Finally, even in the modern age,
medical investigation remains subject to bias arising from financial interest
and skewed reporting of trial outcomes.71
To begin with, let us consider the problem of identifying new effective
therapies. The history already discussed should indicate that this problem is
far from trivial; as already mentioned, many decades passed between the
seminal work identifying bacteria as the source of many diseases and the
identification of effective antibiotic treatments for many common infectious
diseases. As a general matter, we cannot test or compare treatments until
we have identified them as plausible candidates, and indeed the history of
medical innovation is littered with useful inventions whose promise lay
unrealized for some time.72
So a central challenge of maximizing medical effectiveness is the high
cost of finding new candidate treatments. One of the reasons such costs can
9503.PDF.
67
John Barbour, The Century of Wonder Drugs/Antibiotics: Medical Savior for Millions/Advent of Sulfa
and Penicillin Later Made Cardiac Surgery, Organ Transplants Possible, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1991, at A25,
available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1991_827186/the-century-of-wonder-drugs-antib
iotics-medical-sa.html.
68
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 2–3 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/
doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (noting that the cost of finding an innovative new drug in the modern
regulatory environment exceeds $800 million per new molecular entity).
69
See generally Richard A. Deyo, Using Outcomes to Improve Quality of Research and Quality of
Care, in EVIDENCE-BASED CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 65–66 (John P. Geyman
et al. eds., 2000).
70
See id.
71
See id.
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See Barbour, supra note 67.
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be quite high is that the risks of employing the wrong treatments can be
substantial.73 This can lead us to demand high standards of evidence of
safety and efficacy before we will tolerate the use of a treatment.74 In
modern medical history, this concern has manifested most notably in the
area of pharmaceutical treatments.
Although pharmaceuticals represent some of our greatest modern
medical innovations, they also have enormous power to do harm. Take the
famous tragedy associated with a once popular sleeping tablet called
thalidomide. Developed by the German firm Chemie Grünenthal in the
1950s, thalidomide showed enormous promise as a sleep aid,75 producing a
“deep, natural, all-night sleep without a hangover.”76 Unlike most other
sleeping pills of the time, it had low acute toxicity, meaning that there was a
large difference between the dosage that would induce sleep and the dosage
that would induce death.77 Once it was approved in many countries
(although not yet in the United States), doctors began prescribing it for a
wide range of conditions; it was used to treat “colds, coughs, influenza,
nervousness, migraine and other headaches, . . . asthma,” and, most
tragically, nausea.78 Unfortunately, thalidomide was a teratogen, capable of
causing birth defects in developing fetuses if taken at very specific times
during early pregnancy.79 Since pregnant women frequently used it to treat
their nausea at night, many thousands of deformed infants were born across
Europe before the drug’s teratogenic effect was understood.80
The case of thalidomide illustrates well the challenges involved in
making sure a new treatment is safe and effective. The drug manufacturer
had first tested thalidomide on mice, rats, guinea pigs, and rabbits, and it
had observed no ill effects during those experiments.81 But this sort of
investigation proved unable to detect warning signs about the drug’s

73
See generally Jonathan V. O’Steen & Van O’Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument Against
Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (2006).
74
See generally id.
75
SNEADER, supra note 27, at 367.
76
Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 458, 460 (1986).
77
Carrie L. Radomsky & Norman Levine, Thalidomide, 19 DERMATOLOGIC CLINICS 87, 87 (2001).
78
Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460.
79
See WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 277.
80
Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 459. The lag between the first birth defects and the
discovery of thalidomide as the cause was exacerbated by Grünenthal’s attempts to conceal information
regarding these birth defects from their potential customers. See SNEADER, supra note 27, at 367;
WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 276.
81
SNEADER, supra note 27, at 367.
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dangers.82 Many drugs operate similarly in humans and other animals, but
thalidomide is an exception to this rule.83 It has no teratogenic effect on
many non-human test subjects, so even if pregnant animals had been used
as test subjects, the investigation might have missed the drug’s dangers.84
The manufacturer also conducted human trials of the drug, observing no
apparent ill effects during treatment.85 Better-conducted tests in human
subjects might have raised warning signs, but without advance knowledge
of what the drug’s dangers were, researchers were looking for the wrong
things. The drug did cause a “tingling neuritis” in some patients, indicating
possible damage to peripheral nerves,86 which some astute observers
(including FDA analysts) thought might indicate greater risks for gestating
fetuses.87 But such effects were noticed only late in the drug’s history.88
Researchers conducting early trials of the drug may have missed such signs
because the primary dangers presented by most sedative compounds happen
quickly in the form of overdoses.89 As a result, early test subjects would
not necessarily have been monitored for the span of time needed to observe
the neuropathic side effect, which only occurred after “long-term use.”90
And although a controlled experiment involving pregnant women as
subjects could have detected the teratogenicity, the narrow time window
during which the drug could act as a teratogen during fetal development
meant that a large number of pregnant women would have had to have been
tested at varying phases of their pregnancies in order to create a high
likelihood of detecting this dreadful side effect.91 As this example
illustrates, assuring the safety and efficacy of new drugs is a very hard thing
to do. In order to catch all possible ways that a drug might be harmful, it
must be tested for its effects on a variety of subpopulations, using realistic
dosages and time-courses of treatment.
The FDA, which can count its refusal to approve thalidomide for sale in
the United States as one of its great victories, now structures its approval
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Id.
Id.
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See WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 277.
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Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460.
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See The Thalidomide Disaster, TIME, Aug. 10, 1962.
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Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460–61; see also SNEADER, supra note 27, at 368.
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See Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460.
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See id. at 459.
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Id. at 461.
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See WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 277. Disturbingly, it is unlikely that such a test would occur
even today. Our existing FDA approval process, which was developed in part to prevent another
thalidomide scandal, bars pregnant women from acting as test subjects during new-drug development.
Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 464.
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process for new drugs in a manner that aims to forestall similar occurrences.
First, before it will permit any drug trials in human subjects, the FDA
demands the submission of a wealth of data regarding a drug’s composition
and how it is manufactured.92 The agency also requires “[a]dequate
information about pharmacological and toxicological studies of the drug
involving laboratory animals or in vitro,” of a quantity and quality
sufficient to assure the agency that the drug is likely to be safe when tested
on people.93 Then, a company must conduct multiple rounds of human
trials designed to show that the drug is acceptably safe, to demonstrate that
it is therapeutically effective, and to quantify the nature and extent of its
side effects.94
In deciding whether these trials have demonstrated that a drug is ready
to be marketed, the FDA generally requires that the trials be designed in
such a way as to credibly demonstrate the causal impact of the drug.95
Thus, in order to meet the agency’s standards, tests must generally compare
the drug’s effects with the effects of a placebo or of a competing therapy (if
one exists), so that it can be made clear whether the drug improves on
existing alternatives.96 Beyond this, the agency also expects that a portion
of the drug trials involve random assignment of patients to treatment and
control groups to avoid problems of selection bias and to make the
treatment groups and control groups as nearly identical as possible.97 A
selection bias would occur, for instance, if researchers consciously or
unconsciously steered healthier patients towards the drug rather than a
placebo, with the result that the treated group ended up healthier than the
control group due to the selection effect rather than the treatment itself.98
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See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2012).
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See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2012).
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See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2012).
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Id.; see also SACKETT ET AL., supra note 30, at 106–07.
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See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 12–15 (2009); SACKETT ET AL., supra note 30, at 106–07. A classic example
of the impact of selection bias was seen during World War II, when the British asked statistician
Abraham Wald to recommend where they should add additional armor to their bombers. See John D.
Cook, Selection Bias and Bombers, ENDEAVOUR (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.johndcook.
com/blog/2008/01/21/selection-bias-and-bombers/. Upon examining the planes in service, Wald
recommended that additional plating be added only to those spots where he could observe no damage.
Id. The reason, as he explained, was a selection effect: the sample provided consisted only of those
planes that were shot in non-critical locations, given that all the critically damaged planes would have
failed to return. Id. Thus, each bullet hole indicated not a location where planes were in danger of being
shot, but rather a location where they could survive being shot. Id.
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The agency also requires information showing which population subgroups
the drug has been tested in.99 This testing helps to make clear whether the
drug behaves differently (and perhaps dangerously or inefficaciously) when
given to some subpopulations.100
Finally, the agency advises researchers to devise procedures to
“minimize bias on the part of the subjects, observers, and analysts of the
data,” and mentions “blinding” as one means by which to do so.101
Blinding is a classic means by which to avoid a variety of problems in the
measurement of causal effects.102 Either test subjects alone can be blinded
(“single-blinding”), or both subjects and researchers can be blinded
(“double-blinding”), to whether the subjects involved are receiving a real
treatment or only a placebo.103 If subjects are kept ignorant, this can both
preserve the ability of placebos to produce a placebo effect (thus assuring
that real effects can be distinguished from placebo effects) and also can
ensure that subjects do not change their behavior based on inclusion in the
placebo group in a way that might jeopardize the overall results (such as by
seeking alternative treatment during the pendency of the study).104 Blinding
researchers has many benefits as well. Researchers who know which
patients are being treated and which are not may consciously or
unconsciously communicate that information to patients, or may engage in
wishful thinking when measuring results, thus enlarging the treatment’s
effect through biased measurement.105 A randomly assigned, placebocontrolled, double-blinded study with a reasonably large sample size has
enormous power to isolate real effects from false ones, and thus is
commonly labeled as a “gold standard” for measuring clinical efficacy.106
As such, it may provide valuable inspiration for better designed studies of
the efficacy of legal procedures as well, as I shall discuss later.
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The FDA, therefore, goes to great lengths to ensure that
pharmaceuticals are safe and effective before they can be marketed to the
general public. All of this caution, unfortunately, has a downside. Just one
out of every 1,000 tested compounds shows enough promise to make it
through pre-clinical testing (the in-vitro and animal-based studies that
precede human subject testing), and just one in four drugs tested in human
subjects survives the long gauntlet of FDA-mandated clinical trials.107
Companies can generally expect an eight to twelve year process of testing a
product and awaiting the FDA’s decision regarding its marketability,108 and
they must spend hundreds of millions of dollars in research and testing
costs for each new drug they wish to develop and sell.109 This means that
although we can be confident that new drugs are an improvement over old
ones, relatively few companies will be able to afford to engage in the
extensive development process necessary to produce new drugs.110 Indeed,
the FDA has increasingly come under fire in recent years for imposing so
many hurdles in the path of drug developers.111 Some critics have
successfully pressured it to reduce the amount of screening conducted for
new drugs, even though such haste predictably results in more adverse drug
reactions.112
Unfortunately, we face an inevitable trade-off between producing and
testing as many new treatment ideas as possible and protecting patient
safety. We could potentially find many more effective pharmaceuticals if
we lowered the costs involved in trying out new drugs, but that would come
at a human cost. Given the uncertainty involved in trying to predict what
we might discover if we looked harder and what value such discoveries
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See Carrier, supra note 107, at 401 (noting that there are no longer any “garage inventors”
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See Jeffrey S. Barkun et al., Evaluation and Stages of Surgical Innovations, 374 LANCET 1089, 1090
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development).

44

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:25

could have for human health, such trade-offs will necessarily resist
quantified analysis.
It is interesting, nonetheless, to compare pharmaceutical development
with other areas of medicine that the FDA does not regulate as heavily.
New surgical procedures, for instance, do not fall within the FDA’s purview
and are rarely subject to placebo-controlled trials on random subjects.113
This difference cuts both ways: it is much easier to innovate new surgical
techniques than it is to develop new drugs, but we have much less
information regarding the typical safety of surgical interventions than we do
of pharmacological ones.114 The downsides, when we become aware of
them, can be large. A recent, rare example of a blinded, placebo controlled,
randomly assigned surgical trial addressed one of the most common types
of orthopedic surgery: arthroscopic lavage of arthritic knees.115 When the
investigators compared the operation with one in which patients received
only skin incisions and anesthesia, but no surgery, it turned out that this
operation, which was taking place more than 650,000 times per year, was
no more effective than the placebo.116 Numerous patients, therefore, had
been undertaking the risks of surgery for no real therapeutic benefit.117
Whether more surgeries should be tested to the extent that most drugs are
remains a question that deeply divides the medical profession,118 showing
that the evidence-based revolution in medicine is still very much a work in
progress.
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E. The Special Challenge of Validating Diagnostic Tests
Between the extremes of high cost, high quality pharmaceutical design,
and easy but potentially untrustworthy surgical innovation lies another
target of the modern evidence-based medicine movement: diagnostic and
screening tests, which are intended to detect whether patients harbor various
hard-to-detect diseases.119 Over the last twenty years, reformers have
increasingly argued that the decision to engage in diagnostic tests should
depend on the existence of evidence that those tests actually benefit
patients.120 Ideally, a diagnostic test would be risk-free, would be
inexpensive to perform, and would have both perfect sensitivity, meaning
that it generates no false positive results, as well as perfect specificity,
meaning that it generates no false negatives.121 In the real world, this will
rarely be the case. Often the most accurate tests will be expensive or
dangerous to a patient, and no test can ever be perfectly accurate.
There will therefore always be a need among doctors for new tests that
offer reasonably accurate results in a quick, cheap, and safe manner, as well
as for experiments that can sort the useful tests from the bad. Moreover,
state-of-the-art methods of validating diagnostic tests have a unique
relevance for designers of the rules governing the litigation process. The
litigation system itself can be conceived of as a special type of diagnostic
test, designed to detect when a set of facts has occurred that gives rise to
legal consequences. Its methods and results may be different, but the goal
of ensuring high sensitivity and specificity is the same.
Special research designs are needed to validate diagnostic tests. First,
the general method for evaluating a test relies on comparing it with an
existing “gold standard” of diagnosis.122 Such gold standards are those
existing tests that maximize specificity and sensitivity to the greatest extent
possible.123 Of course, both ethical and scientific constraints will make any
gold standard chosen for research purposes a compromise. Doctors cannot
dissect the brains of healthy individuals to validate a test for brain cancer,
and even if they did, the possibility of misclassification of results can never
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be entirely ruled out.124 Still, the idea of a gold standard provides an ideal
towards which research designs can aspire; the more accurate the basis of
comparison, the more confidence we can have that a study of a diagnostic
test accurately represents its true performance.125
Second, due to concerns regarding measurement bias, blinding is still a
valuable principle in tests evaluating diagnostic procedures.126 Many test
results involve significant amounts of interpretation, and the validity of an
assessment of diagnostic validity may be compromised if researchers are
influenced in their interpretation of that ambiguity by the result of another
test.127 Thus, for instance, a radiologist interpreting an ambiguous chest Xray might be more likely to conclude that it shows evidence of a tumor if
she knows that a lung biopsy has indicated that cancer is likely.128 To avoid
this problem, it is ideal to have different individuals perform the test being
assessed and the gold standard to which it is compared, and to keep them
unaware of the other’s conclusions.129
Third, if one wishes to get an accurate estimate of a test’s validity, it is
important to design the coverage of the test cases to resemble how the test
will be used in the real world. Ideally, test subjects would be drawn
randomly from the pool of people to whom the test might be applied under
real world conditions, and then each would receive both the test under study
and its gold standard comparison.130 If researchers pick and choose the
cases that will be studied, bias can result.
Finally, the best studies of screening and diagnostic tests will go
beyond just measuring the tests’ accuracy; they will also assess the extent
to which the information gained tends to come at an unacceptable risk to the
patient’s safety and well-being.131 Just knowing the rates at which tests
produce false positives and negatives is not enough. A good study will
track the real world consequences of such misestimates on patient health
and well-being. Some false positives, for instance, may lead to painful or
dangerous biopsies, while others will be less costly. Some false negatives
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may be fatal, while others will be correctible at little long-term risk to the
patient. By comparing measures of long-term health when the test is or is
not used, researchers can offer some guidance as to whether its accuracy
comes at an unacceptable price. In particular, if a test increases knowledge
but generally makes patients less well, it should be avoided.
This distinction between what helps in the short term and what
produces good long-term outcomes is one that modern proponents of
evidence-based medicine emphasize. In general, the reformers urge, the
best evidence regarding the quality of medical treatments or tests tracks
“ultimate outcomes of interest,” like overall patient mortality, morbidity, or
pain levels, rather than “surrogate outcomes” in the form of discrete
physiologic phenomena.132 This is a shift from the approach that long
predominated, in which physicians focused their efforts on changing easily
measureable surrogate outcomes.133
As an example, a physician interested in preventing future heart attacks
in a patient with high cholesterol might wish to examine the efficacy of
prescribing a medicine that lowers cholesterol. A study using a surrogate
outcome might rely on blood cholesterol levels to demonstrate the drug’s
impact, while one focusing on ultimate outcomes might look at the effect of
the drug on overall mortality.134 In some cases, the difference would be
quite significant; some drugs, for instance, will lower cholesterol while
increasing overall mortality.135 Such cures are truly worse than the disease,
and provide an important cautionary tale about overreliance on theoretical
understandings of complex systems. As one doctor explains, “Recognition
is growing that physiologic, laboratory, and imaging outcomes are
sometimes poorly associated with symptomatic, functional, and survival
outcomes.”136 For this reason, there is much value in tracking not just those
changes in biological processes that are expected to improve a patient’s
quality of life, but also more direct measures of quality of life such as
survey responses.137 By doing so, clinicians can notice when their
theoretical assumptions no longer guide the way towards improving patient
well-being.
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One last note of caution is in order regarding the value of evidencedriven design of medical treatments. Those who innovate medical
treatments often stand to gain a great deal of profit from them,138 and even
when treatments are developed in an academic setting, there may be
incentives to advance an individual researcher’s career at the expense of
promoting accurate knowledge regarding effective treatments.139 These
factors can lead to “publication bias,” in which trials favoring the safety and
efficacy of drugs are published while those that cast doubt on efficacy are
suppressed.140 The medical establishment has taken some steps to rein in
the biasing effects of having trials funded by those who look to profit from
selling a treatment through disclosure rules, but such rules have proven
challenging to enforce.141 What is more, even government oversight may
not always be sufficient to incentivize adequate investigation into the
potential risks of highly profitable treatments.142 Thus, in addition to the
challenges described above, the development of an evidence-based culture
faces an additional roadblock in the form of profit incentives that may
inhibit the willingness of manufacturers to investigate and publicize
evidence that blockbuster drugs are dangerous or ineffective.
Still, despite these challenges, an evidence-based approach to medical
testing and treatments has gone a long way towards improving the quality
of medical care over the long term. What is more, the existence of a culture
that regularly performs such testing provides us with an important basis for
trusting the efficacy of medical treatments as a general matter. Still, as we
have seen, the dialogue is still ongoing within the medical community
regarding how stringent such testing should be. There are costs and dangers
associated with either too much or too little testing before treatments are put
into general use.
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III. WHY PROCEDURAL DESIGNERS NEED BETTER DATA
The lessons of evidence-based medicine reform may be good or bad
news, depending on how we look at them. The turn towards systematic
measurement of treatment efficacy, coupled with a detailed investigation
into the causes of disease, has enabled medicine to grow vastly more
effective and safe than it once was.143 Since we do not, in general, subject
most new procedural devices to similar scrutiny, this suggests that there is a
great deal of available low-hanging fruit in the form of improvements to
procedural design that could be obtained just by looking carefully at which
existing devices work well and which do not.144 At the same time, doctors
are still wrestling to consistently apply evidence-based criteria to their
decision making, and many complain that the costs of requiring careful
investigations might retard the creativity needed to locate the next
generation of novel therapies.145 This suggests that the road towards
systematically testing procedural efficacy may be quite challenging and
costly if we wish to do it right.
Why, then, should we bear these burdens? This Section will illustrate
some of the challenges that arise for those who would design rules of
procedure or evidence without drawing on data from controlled procedural
trials, and also why such trials are hard to do well. It turns out that intuition
and anecdotal experience are likely to be poor guides towards procedural
success.146 What is more, most existing attempts to assess procedural
efficacy using statistical analysis of observational data fall short because
their methods are unlikely to yield trustworthy conclusions about the causal
impact of different rules.147 We might solve many of these problems by
running controlled experiments that compare the impacts of different
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procedural and evidential rule regimes,148 but the vast and interconnected
nature of judicial institutions will make such experiments hard to do and
will mean that some important questions may lie beyond our ability to
measure.
When deciding whether to adopt a new rule of procedure or evidence,
rule makers typically seek to optimize a few variables.149 They would like
to make rules that achieve good outcomes, that do not create excessive costs
for the litigants or the justice system, and that do not protract litigation for
no benefit.150 To achieve meaningful procedural improvements, they have
to evaluate a complicated question: Would the litigation system, over time,
strike a better balance among these values via the implementation of a new
rule, or would it be better to continue using an existing one? This question
is partly normative, given that there will always be value-driven
disagreements regarding the appropriate balance between the differing
values. No one can claim to have an objective basis, for instance, on which
to decide how much we should spend to achieve a given increment of
accuracy. Rather, the appropriate balance will always depend on the
comparative importance one attaches to each factor. But there is also an
objective component to such an inquiry: In a given set of cases, two
different rule regimes, if implemented, might produce a different balance of
accuracy in results, perceived fairness, time-to-case-completion, overall
cost, and cost distribution. So in deciding what procedures we should adopt
for settling disputes, we combine two main inputs: a set of normative
preferences regarding the ideal balance between factors like accuracy,
perceived fairness, and costs, and a set of factual judgments regarding how
the competing rule alternatives would impact those factors.
A. The Challenges of Designing New Procedural Rules
For a variety of reasons, anticipating the impact of a proposed rule on
these values is very hard to do. First, each legal case will be different, and
may respond differently to the new rule. Here there is a strong analogy
with medical research: Just as each individual has a unique medical history
and constellation of symptoms, so each case involves a new combination of
facts, legal rules, parties, lawyers, and judicial staff. Just as we cannot
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know how safe drugs are in general by seeing how they behave in a small
group of patients, we cannot easily estimate the impact of a rule by seeing
how it operates in a few cases.151 Doing so risks the legal equivalent of the
thalidomide crisis.152 There, initial testing failed to include pregnant
women, and thus failed to catch the drug’s dangerous side effects for
developing fetuses.153 In legal contexts, we might expect similar results,
because a rule applied to good effect in one sort of setting may have more
negative impacts if applied in new arenas.
Historically, it is easy to identify occasions when procedural rule
makers made this mistake. Perhaps the most notable recent instance
occurred during the enactment of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1937. Reformers such as Charles Clark desired to make litigation faster
and more efficient.154 They noted that a relatively new procedural device,
the motion for summary judgment, had advanced these ends in English
practice.155 In this early version of summary judgment, a plaintiff seeking
liquidated damages could obtain speedy justice by filing an affidavit
showing that there were no factual disputes necessitating a jury trial.156 If
the defendant failed to file a counter-affidavit showing that a factual dispute
in fact existed, a court could then allow the plaintiff to recover damages
without going through the formalities of a jury trial.157
Seeing the success of summary judgment in this narrow context, the
drafters urged that the new rules should incorporate a similar provision that
could be used in all types of cases, whether or not liquidated damages were
involved, and that could be sought by either plaintiffs or defendants.158 The
enactors of the new Federal Rules obliged.159
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Unfortunately, the birth of this rule provides a classic example of how a
rule can behave differently than expected when used in new ways and in
new types of cases. Although a broader version of summary judgment,
similar to the new federal experiment, had been tried in Michigan, the
drafters of the new rule did not collect any data regarding its performance
before copying it on a much larger scale.160 Rather, they relied on their
intuitive understanding of the judicial process and their imaginations to
predict its future performance. They expected that the rule would primarily
be used by plaintiffs to “pierce assumed or fictitious defenses,”161 but
instead the rule is now primarily employed by defendants who claim that
plaintiffs have not collected enough evidence to prevail at trial.162 What is
worse, many observers believe that summary judgment, used in this
unforeseen way, multiplies legal costs rather than reducing them (although,
as we shall see, this is a very hard thing to show empirically).163
Why did our reformers not see this coming? It is not because they were
uninterested in collecting data—Clark, in particular, was a major proponent
of amassing descriptive statistics on the operation of law in action in
everyday cases.164 Rather, it seems that when they imagined expanded use
of the device, they failed to anticipate how differing circumstances might
impact its workings. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, especially those paid on
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contingency, have little incentive to employ stalling tactics, but defendants
and their attorneys can sometimes benefit by using summary judgment as a
means of delaying cases and raising costs for plaintiffs.165 Particularly in
high-stakes cases, defendants will have much to win, and little to lose, by
seeking summary judgment. So instead of being used in rare cases166 as “a
simple and quick way of disposing of routine . . . cases of debts or
liquidated demands,” as Clark expected,167 litigants now routinely move for
summary judgment in large and complicated cases where its efficiencypromoting value is less clear.168
Of course, none of this happened overnight, and there were many steps
along the way that helped usher in the modern use of summary judgment.
Some courts, including the Third Circuit, initially attempted to resist the
movement towards defensive use of summary judgment by allowing
plaintiffs to point to their pleadings as evidence of material fact disputes,
but the Rules Committee amended the rule to make it clear that this was not
appropriate.169 The “basic purpose” of summary judgment, they explained,
was to “assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for
trial.”170 Two decades later, in the group of cases that have become known
as the summary judgment “trilogy,”171 the Supreme Court gave its blessing
to the widespread use of summary judgment as a defensive device. Celotex
was particularly important in this regard: noting its view that summary
judgment should be viewed as an “integral part of the Federal Rules” rather
than a “disfavored procedural shortcut,” the Court held that defendants
should be able to obtain summary judgment so long as they could show an
absence of evidence favoring the plaintiff’s claim; counter-evidence
disproving the claim would not be necessary.172
Perhaps these
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consolidating amendments and interpretations of the rule could be viewed,
to a greater extent than the rule’s original drafting, as effectively pursuing a
goal of enabling widespread use of summary judgment by defendants. But
the basic point remains: it was not long after summary judgment had been
promulgated before it started to be used in a way that the original rule
drafters never anticipated. And perhaps these subsequent ratifications and
expansions would never have seemed like a worthy idea if not for the
gradual spread of the defensive use of the device from non-existent, to an
occasional rarity, into a method of case management that eclipsed trials on
the merits. Thus, modern judges, lawyers, and litigants might be likened to
the frog that, in the old tale, never realized that a pot of water in which he
was swimming was slowing rising to a boil until it was too late; we have,
by slow and steady pressure from the defense bar, become inured to a
procedure that we might not have elected had we been offered a clear
choice at the outset, at least in the absence of evidence that it saves either
time or money in the aggregate. And given that other rules most likely
undergo similar evolution over time, this might give us reason to doubt that
our procedures, on average, strike an optimal balance between their costs
and their benefits.
The remedy for such mismatches between expected and actual rule
functioning might seem clear: give rules a limited trial run before
implementing them on a wide scale.173 Unfortunately, rules in practice may
end up working very differently over the long term than they do during such
trials. Summary judgment continues to provide an instructive example.
The drafters of Rule 56 might have looked to Michigan’s experience with a
very similar rule in order to gauge its likely utility, but although this might
have helped a bit, they still would have had a drastically limited picture of
how it would operate over the long term in federal litigation. Part of the
problem was that the rule designers sought to make many reforms to federal
civil litigation simultaneously.174 They thus did far more than just expand
summary judgment; they also merged legal and equitable cases, enacted a

173
Several commentators have made proposals along these lines. Some have urged a process of
formal and rigorous experimentation with new rules. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 144, at 366–68; Walker,
supra note 144, at 67–68. Others have promoted the use of local informal “experiments” with rules even
in the absence of randomized testing. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 144, at 1799; Tobias, supra note 144, at
1324–28. At one point in the early 1990s, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee briefly considered
amending the rules to facilitate such informal experimentation, although the Standing Committee tabled
this idea. Tobias, supra, at 1324.
174
See Subrin, supra note 166, at 922–25.

2012]

Evidence-Based Litigation Reform

55

plaintiff-friendly notice-pleading regime, and made a broad array of
discovery available to litigating parties.175
The adoption and expansion of civil discovery, in particular, critically
changed the dynamics of the summary judgment device. Discovery and
factual investigation, taken together, are now the most time-consuming
tasks that litigators face,176 and an increasingly large volume of this time
and expense is devoted to preparing elaborate records for supporting and
defending summary judgment motions.177 When the drafters envisioned the
costs of moving for summary judgment, they imagined an affidavit-driven
practice, but courts and rule makers, desiring to make the process as fair
and accurate as possible, have invited litigants to take extensive oral
depositions, introduce interrogatory answers, and amass large quantities of
requested documents.178 Preparing this, and reviewing it, takes a great deal
of time, and—given the rarity of trials—it is quite possible that the time and
expense we save by granting summary judgment motions in some cases is
outweighed by the time and expense we lose preparing for, reviewing, and
deciding summary judgment motions.
B. The Challenges of Detecting Procedural Effects Using Observational
Data
Summary judgment, then, provides an object lesson in the difficulty of
designing new procedural rules: our instincts about how litigators will
employ such rules may be misguided, and even observing how the rule has
worked in practice may be unilluminating, given that future use may
juxtapose one new rule with others and that the interaction among rules
may be unpredictable. Indeed, even though modern scholars have gone to
great lengths to gather and evaluate observational data,179 we still know
very little regarding the question we started with: Does the availability of
summary judgment increase the overall efficiency of litigation?
The basic problem we face is that the answer to this question is
counterfactual. No matter how many times we count how often such
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motions are brought, how often they succeed, or how expensive they are,
we will not be able to determine how the same cases would have proceeded
if summary judgment was not available. Nor will it do to compare cases in
which such motions are brought with those in which they are not. Lawyers
do not decide whether or not to make a summary judgment motion at
random, so comparing the two groups of the cases will draw on biased
samples and produce data that is unilluminating.180 And we cannot
compare cases decided before and after the new rule was implemented
(even if we had easy access to good data from that period, which we do
not), because we will not be able to tell whether any changes were wrought
by the addition of summary judgment or by one of the many other changes
to federal procedure that the new rules introduced.181 A more promising
answer would be to compare similar cases brought in two jurisdictions that
were as similar as possible except that one lacked summary judgment.
Locating such a perfect comparison, however, may prove frustrating, given
the wide adoption of summary judgment in United States jurisdictions and
the numerous dissimilarities one would encounter if one tried to draw on
foreign examples.
These problems can be seen more clearly if we shift to an example that
has sparked much more recent debate: the impact of the Supreme Court’s
recent pleading cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly182 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.183 Courts had long interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to
require relatively modest “notice” pleading, but in these two decisions the
Supreme Court instructed that plaintiffs must also provide sufficient detail
to make their claims “plausible.”184 Most scholars agree that this new
wording raised the bar by which lower courts evaluate the sufficiency of
civil complaints, which in theory should make it harder for plaintiffs to
press their claims.185 But not all agree,186 and rule makers are waiting to see
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evidence that these decisions are impacting dismissal practice before they
consider whether the “new” rule should be returned to its former state.187
A number of studies have attempted to detect whether Twombly and
Iqbal have made it harder for plaintiffs with valid claims to be heard by the
courts.188 Although these efforts are well-meaning and have involved
substantial effort, they are instructive more for their shortcomings than their
successes. In the first place, it is remarkably hard to get systematic data
about what courts do. Most of the studies, in an attempt to save money and
time, cull case data from legal search engines like Westlaw, even though
most agree that this represents a biased sample of cases and almost surely
overcounts grants of dismissals as compared with denials.189 So far, one
group of researchers has gotten fuller access to court data while conducting
research for the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”), and has used electronic
docket data in order to get a broader picture of the grant rate for motions to
dismiss.190 Drawing on a large sample of cases, the FJC study authors
compared case activity in 2006 (before Twombly was decided) and 2010 (a
year after Iqbal was decided).191 They reported that more motions to
dismiss were filed in 2010 than in 2006, both on an absolute and on a
percentage basis.192 They also showed that courts more readily granted
motions to dismiss “with leave to amend” in the later year, but that courts
were not more likely to grant such motions “without leave to amend,”
which would indicate that the plaintiff was being finally thrown out of
court.193 They then explained that although the increase in “without leave
to amend” dismissals was accompanied by a slight rise in case terminations
soon after those orders, those increases were small enough that they could
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plausibly be the result of random variation between the two years.194
Finally, they demonstrated that if one creates a statistical model that
controls for a few factors195 unrelated to the Supreme Court’s decisions, the
rise in “without leave to amend” grants disappears except in “financial
instrument” cases, a category in which there has been a surge of litigation
arising out of the economic downturn of 2008 and which plausibly might be
dismissed at a higher rate due to the novel theories such cases often
incorporate.196
But although this data is helpful in giving us some sense of how
Twombly and Iqbal have affected civil case processing, it still leaves many
of the most important questions unanswered. For one thing, the study is
limited to looking at those claims that were actually filed, which means it
cannot detect the degree to which plaintiffs with valid claims are deterred
from filing lawsuits.197 Given that one would expect rational plaintiffs to
take into account the likelihood of losing a motion to dismiss in their
calculations when deciding whether or not to sue, this means that this study
may substantially undercount the harm that the new pleading rule does to
some deserving plaintiffs.
On the flip side, of course, the study has no way of assessing the merit
of dismissed claims.198 Perhaps the increase in motions filed and granted is
due to a rise in dubious filings over the last few years (perhaps in the
recently swollen “financial instrument” category, which courts are able to
screen out using dismissal orders). If that were the reason for the rise in
dismissals, it would make a poor case for reform efforts. But it is equally
possible that the new filings are in fact better than average, but that courts
nevertheless abuse their authority under Twombly and Iqbal to disfavor
novel claims. The basic problem is that, without a measure of the changing
validity of complaints over time, any attempt to infer that Twombly and
Iqbal have had either a beneficial or a negative impact based on grant rates
alone misses the point. Even if other authors are correct that grant rates are
increasing for reasons unrelated to changing filing patterns,199 this could be
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a sign that the new approach is succeeding, if there has been an uptick in
frivolous filing. Conversely, even if dismissals are holding steady or even
declining, this might be masking a real impact, if the average validity of
complaints was rising.
Ultimately, however, there is a deeper problem with observational
studies of this design: the dubiousness of inferring causal impact based on
snapshots of litigation activity before and after a rule’s enactment. In some
areas, estimating causation based on before-and-after measurements can be
a reasonably valid approach.200 But when dealing with new rules of
procedure or evidence, we should place low confidence in conclusions
driven by such reasoning. Such research designs are subject to a dilemma.
If we measure very soon before and after a new rule comes into effect, we
may be reasonably confident that any before-and-after differences are due
to the new rule.201 But, as the authors of the FJC study explain, legal rules
take time to percolate before arriving in a longer-term equilibrium form.202
Lower court judges may disagree about how to apply a new rule, appellate
courts may reshape the rule through interpretation, and lawyers may
develop new tactics that change how the rule works in practice. The
clearest example of why short-term measurement is a risky approach is
summary judgment; for decades after the enactment of that device, it was
used quite cautiously,203 but over time it became increasingly attractive to
federal judges facing rising docket pressures and perceiving an excess of
frivolous litigation.204 A study examining the few years after its enactment
would have failed, therefore, to appreciate its likely long-term impact.
Similarly, it may turn out that lawyers with good claims are almost always
able to find the facts they need to satisfy a plausibility inquiry, but that it
will take time for them to learn how. In that case, any initial impact of the
new regime on meritorious plaintiffs may evaporate over the longer term,
and a short-term study would badly overstate the new rules’ demerits.

200

See generally Lind et al., supra note 181, at 97–99.
We can reasonably assume that most other variables within the legal system look fairly similar
right before and right after a major change in law. Occasionally this is not the case, but using a small
time horizon makes it easier to notice any other major confounding changes. It would not be safe to
make such an assumption in situations where many changes were occurring at once, as is the case when
a number of new rules come into existence simultaneously.
202
See CECIL ET AL., supra note 184, at 2–3.
203
See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1946).
204
See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 1022–41 (2003).
201

60

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:25

Unfortunately, the other horn of the dilemma is equally troubling. If we
lengthen our before-and-after period to try and wait for a real ruleapplication equilibrium to arise, it becomes increasingly likely that other
changes in the legal system’s operation will make it hard to isolate the
causal effect of a rule change. Take the FJC study as an example: even
though the authors wait only a year after the second of the two cases that
propound the new pleading regime, they already report a significant rise in
federal court caseloads and a shift in the types of cases being brought.205 It
may be possible to credibly control for such changes using statistical
methods,206 but such modeling can only correct for changes that researchers
can anticipate and measure. Many other aspects of litigation relevant to
motion-to-dismiss practice might be occurring, from changes in lawyering
tactics or changes in the overall economic climate to changes in the makeup
and ideology of the federal bench, any of which might affect pleading
practice. The longer we wait, the surer we can be that we have not
anticipated or measured all the relevant factors. In short, whether we
engage in short-term or long-term before-and-after observation of rule
impacts, we will always face significant unknowns regarding the true
impact of new rules.207
It is, of course, theoretically possible that our intuition and ratiocination
can succeed where our attempts at explicit measurement cannot. Maybe, in
other words, we should not worry about defects in our ability to measure
the impact of rules so long as the results of questionable research designs
accord with what procedural scholars expect. After all, people were
throwing and catching balls long before Isaac Newton provided a
formalized understanding of gravity. Perhaps judges and lawyers, after
enough immersion in the legal system, develop an intuitive understanding
of litigation that rivals our in-built facility for predicting the movement of
physical objects in space.208 If that was the case, an evidence-based
movement might actually do more harm than good by causing us to throw
out our theoretic judgments based on (as we have seen) the questionably
valid data we normally can gather regarding procedural questions.
Unfortunately, this theoretical possibility is almost certainly not a
reality, no matter how much confidence individual lawyers and judges have
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in their ability to say which new rules would work well and which poorly.
For one thing, internal confidence is a poor guide to such accuracy. The
ball thrower knows, with practice, that he can hit a target, but he knows this
because regular, clear feedback is easy to get in such an environment. By
contrast, it is hard to say for sure whether a new rule is improving legal
practice or not; “success” is described as an optimal trade-off among
competing values, and no one occupies an omniscient perspective from
which all costs and benefits can be assessed. Our position is much more
like the sixteenth century doctor than the baseball player. We know we
want to resolve cases quickly, cheaply, and correctly, just as the doctor
knew he wanted to make sick people better, but any one outcome could be
the result of our new intervention or something else entirely. Just as it was
hard to evaluate the success of bloodletting by evaluating cases one at a
time, so it is hard to evaluate the effect of a rule providing for sanctions for
discovery misconduct just by reading cases that employ it.
C. Building on the Medical Example: Using Randomized Controlled Trials
of New Rules of Procedure
Perhaps, however, the medical analogy can do more than help us define
the limits to our present knowledge. Can the recent rise of evidence-based
medicine teach us more sophisticated ways to evaluate procedural success?
Perhaps it can. One of the greatest tools in the rise of scientific medicine
has been the randomized controlled trial.209 Such trials represent a gold
standard method of assessing causation because they isolate the impact of a
single factor’s presence or absence in a comparison between two groups
that are as close to identical as is possible.210 If we wish to have greater
confidence that new rules actually provide a significant benefit over the
status quo, randomizing rule application so that some litigants will be
randomly assigned the new rule, while others the old one, has the potential
to isolate the causal effect of the new rule. What is more, such a trial could
be run for long enough that litigators and judges in a particular area develop
enough experience using the new rule to provide an indication of what a
“mature” version of such a rule-in-action will be.
This proposal has strong intuitive appeal, and a number of scholars
have made proposals along these lines over the years.211 On a few
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occasions, courts and scholars have dipped their toes into these waters,
testing out new procedural rule proposals using randomized experiments.212
Despite the promise of such an idea, however, we must be realistic about
what would be involved in attempting to improve our litigation system
through systematic testing of this nature. The history of medicine shows
that although some effective therapies can be found by a brief bit of
experimental testing,213 there was a long period during which
experimentation served primarily to show doctors what failed to help
without providing much guidance as to what could do better.214 Two
transformations were necessary before we could develop high confidence in
medical therapies (and in some areas of medicine, these two
transformations may still be works in progress).
First, it was necessary to test many alternative models of how the body
worked in order to develop an accurate understanding of the underlying
biology of bodies and their diseases.215 Here, legal scholars may start with
an advantage, as we will not need to invent microscopes in order to develop
plausible theories of “lawsuit physiology.”
Rather, once initial
confidentiality challenges are overcome, the relevant players can be
interviewed and a large amount of data about the internal workings of cases
can be collected at comparatively low cost.
But the other transformation—conducting sufficient experimentation to
locate the best possible rule configurations216—may prove more
challenging. In order to find effective therapies, it is also necessary to try
many things that will fail in order to identify those few things that reliably
succeed.217 Such an undertaking may test our mettle. First, we will have to
develop a willingness to do far more procedural experimentation than has
historically been the norm. Second, we will be challenged by the fact that
we have far fewer courts than human beings. Trying to run multiple trials
in the same court at one time may risk interaction effects between new rules
supra note 144, at 1324–25; Walker, supra note 144, at 67–68; Willging, supra note 1, at 1197, 1201–
04.
212
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that we cannot reliably untangle through analysis. So there would be
challenges involved in setting appropriate research priorities and allocating
courts to different rule-trials.218 In the end, it seems doubtful that we will
identify many optimal procedural choices through the sort of sporadic, ad
hoc experimentation that has been typical of the last few decades.
I will not belabor the value of randomized trials as compared with
observational studies. Others have made that argument better than I can,
and in any event it may be possible to approximate many of the benefits of
randomized experiments through increasingly thoughtful design of
observational studies. There is one final challenge involved in creating an
evidence-based procedural reform movement that has no parallel in
medicine, however, and which will inevitably plague attempts to make
evidence relevant to procedural design whether we conduct experiments or
count case outcomes.
As discussed above, doctors have sometimes disagreed about whether
to measure objective immediate indicators of health or more ultimate, but
subjective, qualitative information.219 Procedural reform, however, will
involve a much thornier challenge. Simply put, some of the outcome
variables of greatest interest to procedural reformers go unmeasured in
nearly all empirical investigations of procedural effects, even those
observational or experimental studies that approach most closely a gold
standard ideal. In particular, one of the key goals of procedure is to achieve
“just” or “accurate” outcomes in individual cases, but almost no studies
attempt to measure accuracy. The next few sections of this Article will
discuss the severity of this problem and how it might be addressed through
novel research designs.
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF MEASURING ACCURACY WHEN EVALUATING
PROCEDURAL RULES
As we have discussed, rules of procedure are hard to design, both
because rules behave unpredictably and because it is hard to detect the true
impact of the rules governing the litigation system. Perhaps, then, rule
makers should imitate those who promote evidence-based decision making
in medicine, and seek to collect and use better data before arriving at
decisions. Indeed, those who are attracted to such a solution might look
optimistically to the rising tide of empirical analyses of legal policy
questions. But before we confidently board the evidence-based train, it is
critical that we pause and reflect on the ways that getting the right evidence
relating to questions of litigation policy differs from what is typical in the
medical world, or even what is typical for most questions of regulatory
policy.
Unfortunately, those who would create the architectural rules of
litigation face a special challenge: one of the key variables of interest when
comparing rules is the degree to which they promote the accurate resolution
of cases, but no easy metric exists external to the litigation system that
allows for broad comparisons of the accuracy of case results. So if we want
to get the benefits of evidence-based procedural design, neither the
observation of existing cases, or even experiments where we compare
differing rules, will give us the answers that we need. As a result, the costs
of an evidence-based litigation movement are higher than they initially
appear, and procedural designers should proceed with great caution before
making decisions based on the sort of data that existing empirical
scholarship can provide.
A. An Example: Assessing the Civil Gideon Debate
The need for accuracy measurement can best be illustrated by
considering another example: the ongoing debate about the right to
appointed counsel in civil cases. For most of Anglo-American legal
history, it was commonplace for parties even in the most serious criminal
cases to self-represent.220 In serious criminal cases, in fact, defendants were
actively forbidden counsel for hundreds of years.221 After a series of
scandals involving prominent convictions (and executions) obtained by

220
221

See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8–9 (1955).
Id. at 9.

2012]

Evidence-Based Litigation Reform

65

perjured evidence in the late seventeenth century, the tide began to turn, and
it slowly became possible for those felony defendants who could afford
attorneys to retain them as trial counsel.222 But most criminal defendants
are not rich, and so many went without legal advice or representation even
in this new system.223
Only very recently has the tide shifted towards the widespread use of
appointed counsel by the indigent.224 In 1963, the Supreme Court held in
Gideon v. Wainright that the Constitution required states to provide indigent
felony defendants with state-funded counsel.225 This decision is widely
held up as a momentous improvement in the fairness and accuracy of
American criminal prosecutions.226 But although Gideon firmly entrenched
a right for criminal defendants to receive counsel, there are numerous other
areas of litigation, including most types of civil cases, where indigent
parties do not have a right to be represented at state expense.227 Those who
oppose this state of affairs label themselves the “Civil Gideon”
movement.228
So let us consider the debate that is joined between the Civil Gideonites
and the defenders of the status quo. On the status quo side, there are some
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reasons why we might be skeptical that Gideon has been beneficial either
for defendants or for society in general. For one thing, the Court has been
reluctant to extend its ruling to contexts not involving potential
incarceration, suggesting some lingering uncertainty about the need for
appointed lawyers in all cases.229 For another, a right to appointed counsel
is meaningful only to the extent that such counsel is well-funded and wellmonitored; the modern history of indigent criminal defense, by contrast, is
one of “grossly inadequate funding” in which courts are extremely
deferential to decisions made by highly overburdened counsel.230
Overburdened appointed attorneys have strong incentives to conduct little
investigation into their cases and to pressure defendants to settle, and those
incentives may lead the defendants with meritorious cases to be funneled
into the same plea machine as the guilty ones.231 Although this situation
could in theory be resolved through better funding and better oversight of
public defender agencies, in practice criminal defendants as a group lack the
political capital to successfully advance a reform agenda. Still, the Civil
Gideonites might reply that all of these reasons for doubt are merely
suggestive and that the alternatives are likely to be worse. As the Gideon
Court observed, “[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman” may “lack[]
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one.”232 So perhaps even a very poor appointed
attorney is better than proceeding pro se.
So we have a pressing puzzle on our hands: Does appointing counsel
help the indigent, and if so, does it make the system as a whole function
better? There is a large empirical literature attempting to quantify the
benefits and costs of appointed counsel, but sadly it turns out to be of little
use. Advocates of Civil Gideon can point to a deluge of observational
studies showing that represented litigants tend to fare better than those who
represent themselves.233 Despite this onslaught of case data, status quo
defenders have a potent counterattack: observational studies tell us little
about the true effects of representation because they are subject to severe
selection effects.234 The problem with comparing the outcomes that pro se
and represented litigants achieve is that lawyers are not randomly assigned
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to indigent claimants in civil settings; rather, lawyers seek out cases with
merit.235 On the flip side, the indigent litigants who are most likely to seek
out representation may constitute a “disproportionately worldy, futurelooking, and risk-averse” subpopulation who may be more likely to prevail
in litigation regardless of whether they have a lawyer’s aid.236
Better data can be obtained by conducting randomized experiments,
which can create control and treatment groups of indigent litigants who are
as near identical as possible except with respect to the offer of
representation.237 But this inquiry has rarely been conducted, and when it
has the results have been mixed, with a few studies showing positive
impacts of representation and others finding that representation does not
increase the odds of success but does slow down the process of litigation.238
One way to read such mixed results would be to conclude that in trying
to decide when counsel should be appointed, detail is everything. Different
case types and regions may raise or lower the value of having a lawyer in
ways that are hard to predict in advance, although it is possible to concoct
just-so stories to explain data once we have them. In short, we see again the
problem of procedural complexity, and it seems like the most promising
response is to run more experiments in a variety of settings, trying to see
when appointing counsel is helpful and when it is counterproductive.239
The only alternative is to trust our intuitions even when randomized
experiments indicate that they are sometimes unreliable.
But there is a deeper problem with this debate, one that we cannot see
unless we are willing to reframe the measures by which we evaluate the
value of a right to counsel. Recall the discussion above regarding the
modern medical movement towards outcome-based measurement in
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validating the efficacy of medical procedures and diagnostic tests.240 Often,
a medical researcher has the choice between measuring something that is
inexpensive to determine, like cholesterol levels or blood pressure, versus
something that is harder to measure, like long-term changes in mortality or
subjective assessments of overall patient well-being.241 Unfortunately,
choosing the easy-to-measure proxy can have serious penalties for the value
of a research design: given that the body is a very complex environment,
sometimes an intervention may seem to have a positive impact on a proxy
outcome while also having a non-existent—or even harmful—effect on
overall health.242 Therefore, if one wishes to maximize the ability of
medicine to improve patient health, it is best to validate tests and
procedures by measuring their impacts on overall health rather than on
temporary signs that may, or may not, signal true improvements in wellbeing.243
Returning to the Civil Gideon example, we can perceive a similar
dichotomy between cheap-but-accessible and expensive-but-instructive
measurements when we study the efficacy of procedural rules in litigation.
Whether based on statistical analysis of ordinary cases or random
assignment of representational offers, most existing studies of procedural
impact have a common structure: they either observe or experimentally vary
the availability of representation, and then they observe and record certain
variables about case outcomes, trying to detect a link between the two.244 In
theory, well-designed studies that focus on case outcomes, without
measuring accuracy, could help us answer the following questions: Does
representation make a litigant more or less likely to win? Does it make the
case take more or less time to resolve? Does it increase, or decrease,
settlement rates? But they cannot possibly answer what may be the most
important question: Does appointing counsel for indigent clients make it
more or less likely that the ultimate outcome in the case is right?245 After
all, it is at least possible that appointing counsel tends to help more parties
prevail, but that the increase comes primarily in the form of false positives
rather than true positives, and that the overall accuracy of the system
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suffers. Such a result would run strongly counter to the widely shared urge
to make civil litigation outcomes reflect real world facts as accurately as we
can,246 subject to the constraints of cost and practicality. So long as we
focus on what is relatively easy to measure, like who wins, but not on what
matters more, like whether the case outcomes are more or less accurate, the
real significance of these studies will be necessarily limited.
This concern—that without measuring variations in the accuracy of
litigation results, existing studies tell us little about how well the
appointment of indigent counsel furthers some of the justice system’s key
goals—is not unique to the right-to-counsel debate. For instance, the
identical difficulty subverts scholarly attempts to assess the merits of the
recent pleading revolution. Even at its best, this empirical literature is
unable to get at the questions that are of real theoretical interest in the
“Twiqbal” debate. Suppose, for instance, that despite its limits the FJC
study correctly indicates that Twombly and Iqbal have caused judges to
dismiss more cases for failure to state a claim.247 That might be a very good
thing, if most of the dismissed cases are in fact frivolous, or a very bad
thing, if judges are using their newfound freedom to dismiss worthy cases
brought by unpopular groups of plaintiffs.248 One doubts, after all, that the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in these cases hoping to have no effect on
pleading practice. Rather, the aim was to screen out frivolous cases without
affecting meritorious ones.249 If the new rule truly achieves this, it should
be subject to far less criticism than critics presently aim at it. At the same
time, the situation might be inverted; frivolous plaintiffs may well be able
to plead plausible cases most of the time, while some deserving plaintiffs
may lack access to the facts they need. But unless we find a way to
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of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 54–55 (providing evidence that the post-Iqbal
increase in the rate of reported dismissals is higher in race discrimination suits brought by black
plaintiffs than it is in the larger population of suits examined by Moore).
249
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (expressing a worry that a
plaintiff with “a largely groundless claim” could effectively “take up the time of a number of other
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value,” if such
cases cannot be screened out at the pleading stage) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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measure not just the difference in dismissal rates under the two regimes, but
also the comparative validity of the claims that survive and the claims that
are dismissed under each rule, we really are just guessing when we
conclude that the extra dismissals are cause for concern.
B. How Worrying Is Our Failure to Measure Accuracy?
We presently lack any way to systematically assess whether a given
change to a system of dispute resolution makes it function more or less
effectively, because we have no external means to track whether a given
change makes case outcomes more or less accurate on the margin. To see
just how troubling this is, imagine if medical researchers could measure the
cost of new drugs and some of the side effects they produce, but were
barred by medical protocol from measuring whether their drugs make the
patients healthier or sicker. Such an environment would give us little
reason to trust the beneficence of drugs on the market, so by analogy we
should harbor similar doubts with respect to current legal procedures. But
some may wish to resist this analogy, and urge that we either have ways of
determining accuracy without resort to systematic measurement, or that
accuracy is not important enough to be worth measuring. Several
arguments along these lines will be considered in turn.
Some might object that the existing appellate process already operates
to test the accuracy of case outcomes and provides overall data regarding
the accuracy of trial procedures. This response fails for a number of
reasons. First, using data from appeals to measure the appropriateness of
case resolutions suffers from serious selection bias: most cases filed are
never appealed, even though every case filed is resolved in some fashion.250
Some of the filters are legal rules restricting when an appeal can be taken,
while others involve the incentives that parties have to avoid disturbing a
status quo. One of the most common situations is when parties settle their
disputes and thus lack either the legal standing or the desire to further
litigate their claims.251 But if we care about the accuracy of procedures, we
must measure the degree to which settlements track the underlying merit of
cases. What is more, this selection bias will exist even in many cases where
an appeal was taken. Many potential grounds for appeal rely on procedural
issues that do not touch the factual merits of the underlying claims.252 In
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See Clermont, supra note 159, at 1972.
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 10–11 (observing that many wrongful convictions go undetected
by an appellate process that focuses on detecting procedural, rather than factual, errors).
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such cases, the result on appeal will tell us nothing about the factual validity
of the pre-appeal outcome, and it may be very hard to separate out such
procedural grounds of review from substantive ones when studying a large
dataset of cases.
Second, appellate review ordinarily involves both formal and informal
deference to the decision making of a lower court.253 As a result, if we use
appellate reversals as a measure of error, we will systematically undercount
such errors. So if, for example, we are looking at a subset of cases that lead
to jury verdicts, appellate data will not tell us how often such verdicts are
incorrect, but instead only how often they were so incorrect as to be
“unreasonable.” This means that such data will systematically undercount
factual errors at trial.254
Third, and perhaps most importantly, using appellate review as a
measure of accuracy separates one piece of a complex system from the
larger whole in a way that interferes with useful measurement. After all, if
we are trying to measure the accuracy of legal outcomes, the outcome of
most interest is what happens after all legal procedures have run their
course. The appellate process is one aspect of the whole, and it may
interact with whatever changes we are trying to assess. In the end, the error
measurement we would get by using appellate reversal rates would be
worthless: each error counted would be one that the system as a whole
would make right, while none of those errors that are the true concern
would be measured at all.
It seems, therefore, that we lack any systematic information on the
litigation system’s validity. Nevertheless, one can still ask, is that really a
problem? For some, the realization that we just do not know how accurate
our system is will be maddening, while others will shrug. So before turning
to how we can go about measuring, it is worth considering whether it is
worth the bother.255
There are several reasons why our lack of systematic data collection
might seem to be less harmful than it initially appears. One sort of doubter
might say that accuracy, all things considered, is not a weighty enough
variable in the procedural calculus to be worth tracking, at least if the
tracking must be costly. Surely, they would say, there is much more to
legal decision making than getting the facts right, and indeed much of what
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See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (instructing appellate courts to defer to the factual findings of
trial judges unless those findings are clearly erroneous).
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See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 10–11.
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judges and juries do involves the exercise of wisdom and discretion rather
than the reconstruction of historical events.256
There may well be a fairly broad ideological chasm between those who
believe that the goal of accuracy in outcomes is the central benefit we seek
in designing procedure257 and others who think it is merely one virtue of
trials among many, and perhaps not even the most important one.
Nevertheless, I believe that the difficulty of measuring accuracy in legal
outcomes should be of concern to most people interested in procedural
design. For one thing, it will be rare indeed to find someone who goes
beyond listing other procedural values to take the position that accuracy is
harmful or even useless.258 Rather, the more common intuition will be that
we value accuracy as well as other things, such as results that do moral
justice or procedures that feel fair to participants.259 But once this much is
granted, then the failure to measure one key goal among others still seems
problematic. If we found out that medical researchers were failing to
measure the effect of new drugs on health, it would be of little solace to
discover that they were able to carefully measure side effects, even if we
believed that minimizing side effects was very important.
Even if we think accuracy is less important than other values, this
analogy still holds. We care most about curing disease, but we still think it
valuable to collect data on the side effects and costs of new therapies.
Moreover, our ability to reliably achieve some of these other values, like an
emphasis on the ability of the system to allow individuals to vindicate
wrongs done against them, may depend on its ability to regularly figure out
the right facts.260 This would mean that enhancing our ability to maximize
accuracy also helps us further these other values. After all, few if any moral
theories would permit us to determine who is blameworthy and who is not
without reference to at least some facts about their past conduct or states of

256
See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 235–40 (1999) (urging that the structure of our
trials enables the jury to integrate reconstructions of historical fact with practical and moral judgments to
produce an amalgam justice “which is often immeasurably richer” than the outcome of a process
focused solely on accuracy could be).
257
Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV.
319, 337 (2008) (expressing skepticism that the demands of participatory rights can ever rise above the
needs of adjudicative accuracy).
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Indeed, I am aware of no author who has explicitly endorsed such a view.
259
See BURNS, supra note 256, at 239; Solum, supra note 9, at 320–21.
260
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1, 82–87 (1998) (describing the dignitary and social values that support permitting those who have been
harmed to personally seek redress against their wrongdoers using state-supplied mechanisms, and noting
that this value only extends to those cases where the defendant actually violated a right held by the
plaintiff).
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mind.261 Therefore, most pluralists should be worried about the present
failure to measure accuracy in adjudication.
Despite these responses, however, there is a deeper concern, which is
that the concept of accurate case outcomes is too confused to be capable of
measurement. Many, if not most, legal outcomes do not offer a clear
distinction between factual and normative judgments.262 A jury verdict, for
example, may encode historical assumptions, future predictions, and
normative judgments of blameworthiness into a finding of liability and a
damages award.263 Likewise, lawyers may rely on factual assumptions
when negotiating civil settlements, but the ultimate agreement does not
come with a narrative description of what happened that gave rise to the
settlement.264 And when judges dispose of a case on a procedural ground,
they often deliberately avoid making any comment on its underlying factual
merits.265 So many case dispositions blur, or even omit entirely, an inquiry
into what “really happened” in the past.
But even though many case dispositions may not articulate or rely upon
a particular set of found facts, it is still meaningful to ask whether the
relevant decision makers correctly understood the facts that gave rise to the
dispute when making their decisions. Lawyers and judges must regularly
make decisions that rely on an interplay of at least three key features: the
facts as they understand them, the legal rules that oblige certain results, and
their own preferences (to the extent they have discretion to give effect to
them).266 Even if a given outcome depends upon a discretionary choice or a
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Among ethical theories, the two dominant frameworks focus either on evaluating acts by
reference to the consequences they produce or else by the “moral quality of the act . . . in itself.” See R.
George Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the Developing Law of War, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 129, 154–55 (2003) (contrasting consequentialist and deontological modes of
ethical reasoning). Under either approach, one needs to describe conduct or its consequences in some
detail before any reasonable assessment of its ethical propriety can be conducted.
262
See BURNS, supra note 256, at 235.
263
See id. at 235–40; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 49 (permitting but not requiring judges to obtain an
explanation of jury verdicts by using special verdict forms); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring a
reasoned explanation when judges, rather than juries, decide cases).
264
Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring a factual explanation when criminal defendants enter
into plea bargains to resolve their disputes with the government).
265
See, e.g., 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1353 (3d ed.
2011) (noting that dismissals for improper service of process, like many other technical reasons for
dismissing an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), are not “on the merits” and are not intended to preclude
future litigation in which the defect has been corrected).
266
See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 309–10 (1997) (explaining that one must look to
both ideological and legal perspectives in order to adequately understand judicial decision making, and
that the operative facts of a case help to determine the direction of both political preferences and legal
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legal rule, the choice or rule arises based on a factual foundation and might
change if the facts were different.267 So when a mistaken factual
understanding leads to a different outcome than would have occurred were
the true picture known to the decision makers, we can label that outcome
inaccurate even if it does not come with an explicit explanation.
There is a second sense in which factual accuracy matters even for
decisions that are not explicitly or solely factual. Take settlements as an
example. We might care how well lawyers on average understand the facts
before they settle, but we might also feel that even if some information is
hidden from both sides, the process of negotiation might aggregate both
sides’ incomplete information into a single sum that in some sense
incorporates more information than either party possesses. We must be
careful here: there is no meaningful sense in which we can say that there is
an amount that a case “should” settle for based solely on the historical facts
that gave rise to it, so settlement amounts by themselves cannot be said to
be accurate or inaccurate. Nevertheless, we might care how well settlement
values correlate with certain important underlying case facts, such as the
extent of injuries suffered by the plaintiff or the degree to which a physician
acted contrary to ordinary treatment protocols. Although the settlement
amounts cannot be said to be trying to “reconstruct” such data, they do arise
from a process that we intend to respond to variances in those data. So if
settlement amounts are failing to reflect variations in the underlying facts in
the way we would desire, that information is relevant to the design of the
overall system.
An example may make this point more concrete. Several studies, most
published in medical journals, have sought to assess how well the
malpractice litigation system functions as a means of separating negligent
medical errors from other causes of patient morbidity.268 One of the most
recent and most thorough investigations was conducted by David Studdert
and his co-authors in 2006.269 This group of researchers analyzed a large
sample of closed malpractice claims, using independent physicians to
analyze the insurers’ case files in order to determine, to the best of their
ability, which cases involved injured patients and how many of those
analysis).
267
See id. at 310 (noting that “political decision making takes account of facts as well”).
268
See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996); Frederick W. Cheney
et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA 1599 (1989); Henry S. Farber & Michelle
J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994); David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006).
269
Studdert et al., supra note 268, at 2024.
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injuries were due to “medical errors.”270 They then compared these
judgments with the cases’ outcomes, in an attempt to see how often the tort
system produced results similar to what the experts would have viewed as
appropriate.271
This allowed them to produce some interesting
comparisons: 73% of the claims they studied appeared to be either true
positives, in which compensation was provided to a claimant who had been
injured by medical errors, or true negatives, in which compensation was not
provided to a claimant who was either uninjured or whose injuries were not
attributable to medical mistakes.272 Of the remaining quarter of claims, just
over 10% involved false positives, in the form of payment given to those
who had not suffered an injury due to error, while a slightly larger fraction
of 16% involved false negatives, in the form of payments denied to those
who seemed deserving.273
Without belaboring the pluses and minuses of this particular
investigation,274 the approach employed by it and other similar malpractice
studies is quite instructive. By comparing the underlying facts of litigation
with its results, the authors are able to obtain insight on a question that is
rarely explored. That is, we can get some sense of how successful the tort
system is at figuring out what happened in the past. And although this
study (and the others like it that I have been able to find) attempted only to
provide a descriptive picture of how the current litigation system was
functioning, one could combine this novel approach to measuring the
validity of litigation outcomes with an experimental variation of procedural
rules to gain a truly powerful tool for separating useful procedural
innovations from harmful ones. So, when we would prefer that certain facts
correlate substantially with litigation results, one way of assessing how
accurate the legal system is at compensating the right claims is to measure
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Id. at 2026–29.
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Id. at 2027–28.
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Id. at 2028. But cf. Cheney et al., supra note 268, at 1601 (finding a similar rate of correctly
sorted claims, but with a much higher proportion of false positive awards, in a sample of 1,004 closed
anesthesia malpractice claims).
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As the authors acknowledge, the reviewing physicians were not blind to the results of litigation,
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the relationship between the incidences of those facts with typical case
results.
In the end, it seems that most policy makers and critics who wish to
optimize procedural efficacy should care both about how well legal decision
makers understand the cases they decide, and how well their decisions
correlate with the objective facts that the law purports to respond to. So
most of those who seek to maximize accuracy (along with other values) in a
juridical system should be interested in finding ways to measure accuracy in
a more systemic and sustained way.
There is, however, one procedural value that may cut strongly in the
other direction. Those who privilege the system’s legitimacy over all
competing values may be hesitant to look too closely at the details of its
performance, for fear of undermining the public’s faith in our courts.275
Many are properly concerned that legal procedures be viewed as legitimate
both by those who use them as well as by the broader public who observe
proceedings from a distance.276 There are several reasons for this concern.
For one thing, people more readily comply with legal rules concerning
primary conduct when they view legal institutions in a positive light.277
And for some, it may be more important for disputes “to be settled than [for
them] to be settled right,”278 if the alternative is viewed as private self-help
and a gradual descent into social chaos. Indeed, if we are frank with
ourselves, we must admit that exposing the large amount of ignorance we
possess about the utility of our legal procedures might be a poor public
relations move for the litigation system.
For some, this argument may be so powerful as to make any proposal
for increased outcome measurement a non-starter, but I suspect that most
will have a different intuition upon reflection. Caring so much about
legitimacy that we ignore accuracy considerations should leave a very bad
taste in our mouths.279 There would be a strong element of deceit at play if
policy makers and critics know that the justice system is not being careful
to ensure it is getting it right as often as possible but avert their eyes from
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the problem for fear of the public’s reaction.280 It was one thing for medical
science to treat without measuring when few realized that measurement
could help; it would be another for modern medicine to eschew a practice
that has such broad benefits for public health. Perhaps one guidepost that
might caution us to avoid such a course is this: if we fully informed the
public we were trying to protect of the reasons why we might wish to avoid
putting our adjudicative procedures to the test, there are a number of
reasons they might accept (such as a concern for their privacy or an
outlandish cost). It would be very surprising, however, if they would accept
the strong paternalism present in the decision to subject them to the whims
of a legal system that we could have, but have not, tested for accuracy and
fairness.
C. The Risks of Trusting an Untested Procedural System
Assuming that we agree that accuracy is important and that we could
measure it if we were willing to try, is there any further reason to object to a
call for investigations along these lines? Perhaps there is. Many readers
may feel that this is all much ado about nothing; even if we do not track
accuracy systematically, they might say, our procedures are so welldesigned that there is little to worry about.281 Note that this can be true
even if we grant the point made in a previous section that we are bad at
predicting how rules will affect the overall system.282 Perhaps the social
pressures that constrain our legal system gradually nudge it towards good
equilibria (including high rates of accuracy) by aggregating the decisions of
many different decision makers even though none of those individuals
understand the whole.283 Our failure to measure accuracy means we cannot
use data to support such a notion, but if we had strong intuitions that the
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See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural
Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 171, 193 (2005); Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural
Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 647, 656–
59 (1993).
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See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our society
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unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”); United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649
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See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 (1977).
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legal system was self-optimizing, that might be enough to make the costs of
the necessary data gathering too much to bear.
There are two possible responses to such nonchalance. The first is to
note that even if our system is doing pretty well, we might still reasonably
wish to either improve its accuracy further, or else attempt to maintain its
accuracy while decreasing the cost or delay associated with obtaining
resolution of legal claims. Even among those who have the intuition that
the American litigation system functions adequately, I doubt there are many
who feel that it is beyond any possible improvement. But so long as we are
unable to measure the accuracy of changes in procedure, we cannot tell
when we are cutting costs at no detriment to justice and when we are saving
money by sacrificing quality. In other words, if we must balance multiple
factors in designing procedure, we cannot truly say that any change is an
improvement (or even a neutral trade-off) unless we are measuring each of
those factors. And given the extremely complex nature of the system itself,
and the sometimes counterintuitive results of interventions,284 we should be
very reluctant to trust mere intuition that any given cost-cutting measure
comes at no cost to our system’s accuracy.
But we can, and should, go further in responding to those who see no
need to measure how often we get it right or wrong: concluding too readily
that our confidence in our system is predictive of its accuracy stands in
stark contrast to the historical record of legal fact-finding. History shows
that people have often placed their faith and trust in very inaccurate
methods of finding facts.285 And in the present day, the recent spate of
DNA-based exonerations286 serves to underline the point: so long as we fail
to measure the quality of our system’s outputs, we have little reason to trust
that it is functioning in an optimal way.
Start with the historical record: the past provides numerous examples of
people who, in good faith, relied on dispute resolution systems that we
would find impossible to trust. For instance, consider the trial by ordeal.
Like us, the residents of early medieval England had disputes and a need to
resolve them, but when faced with two disputing parties they did not engage
in a process of sifting through evidence to reconstruct historical facts to
decide who should prevail.287 Rather, they relied on God to decide whose
version of events was true and whose was false, and they forced God to
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show his hand by means of such procedures as the ordeal.288 In the ordeal,
one party to a dispute would be put to a physical test in which “he called
upon God to witness his innocence by putting a miraculous sign upon his
body,” such as healing a burn wound without sepsis, causing him to sink
rather than float upon water, or swallow a large morsel of dry food without
choking.289 Anyone who thinks that common sense alone is a reasonable
guide towards designing fair procedures must face the difficult fact that
common sense beliefs may be systematically wrong,290 and the ordeal
example shows that such widespread error is not only possible, but that it
can dominate a legal system for centuries without widespread criticism.291
Some readers may balk at the first example because it involved
explicitly religious assumptions about proof. If so, consider a practice that
lasted for centuries and that was still in widespread use during the first
century of American life: the bar on testimony by interested witnesses.292
This rule totally precluded parties and other interested witnesses from
giving testimony under oath.293 From the 1500s until the mid-nineteenth
century, the firm policy of the judiciary was that a long list of potential
witnesses—including the parties in a civil case, criminal defendants, anyone
with a financial interest in the case’s outcome, anyone previously convicted
of a felony, and atheists—were so likely to lie on the stand that it was better
to dismiss cases entirely for lack of evidence than hear what they had to
say.294 In many cases, the result was that one party had no evidence to offer
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at all to press a claim or defend against it, even if that party would have
resisted the temptation to testify deceptively. As a result, many valid claims
were likely deterred.295 Once again, we see that a great multitude of judges
and lawyers placed their trust in procedures that most today would view as
deeply inaccurate and unfair.
Finally, for those who think we have surely risen above the ignorance
and errors of our past, consider a recent example: the string of DNAevidence exonerations of wrongfully convicted felons.296 On one level, the
introduction of DNA evidence might seem like a basis for increased trust in
our legal system. Indeed, the strength of a properly conducted DNA match
provides our modern “gold standard” for placing a criminal defendant at the
scene of a crime. But the very accuracy of this device has enabled it to
expose ugly flaws in our system of justice: numerous cases that seemed
quite ordinary at the time they were decided turned out to have placed
innocent people in prison.297 The distressing fact that the DNA exoneration
cases illuminate is that most wrongfully decided cases look almost exactly
like accurately decided cases. The defect in such cases does not lie in the
facts known to actors in the legal system, but rather in the facts they failed
to discover or bring to light.298 Nor can we comfort ourselves much with
the fact that the exonerations are relatively few when placed against the vast
number of criminal convictions. Unfortunately, only a small proportion of
decided cases involve untested, but still existing, DNA evidence that can
implicate or exonerate a convicted defendant. 299 Because of this, we cannot
form even a crude estimate of the overall accuracy of our criminal systems
by counting these exonerations. But when placed alongside the historical
record of trust in highly dubious procedural devices, the number of DNAbased exonerations of run-of-the-mill convictions should make us very
hesitant to place blind trust in the accuracy of our system.

56 (1827) (noting the absurd extent to which these interest-based incompetency rules were enforced,
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back, almost none of these cases [in which DNA evidence revealed that a conviction was in error] would
have been considered exceptional among criminal cases”).
299
See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 12 (“If DNA is a ‘truth machine,’ it tells us only about a sliver of
very serious convictions, most for rape, chiefly from the 1980s.”).
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V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: PROCEDURAL EXPERIMENTS THAT
MEASURE ACCURACY
In the preceding sections, we have seen that systematic measurement
has revolutionized the practice of medicine, although there is still a long
way to go before the evidence-based medicine movement can be said to
have prevailed fully.300 Rule makers face great challenges when they
design or amend rules of procedure and evidence because the litigation
environment is a complex system in which it is often difficult to link
procedural cause with substantive effect.301 For this reason, an evidencebased litigation movement might be very attractive, but reformers will not
be able to meaningfully assess the impact of differing rules or rule
applications on the accuracy of case outcomes unless they are willing to go
beyond measuring who wins because simple outcomes make a poor proxy
for the real variables of procedural interest. In particular, if studies fail to
measure accuracy and focus instead on other variables like litigant
satisfaction or cost, we will have little basis for confidence that
improvements in these other variables are not coming at the cost of the
system’s ability to accurately divine the factual merits of litigants’ cases.
Until this problem is addressed, the value of both existing rules and
proposed reforms to them must always remain uncertain for any person who
thinks that accurate outcomes matter. In this section, I will discuss the
challenges inherent in measuring the accuracy of a procedural system and
sketch one possible means for accomplishing this difficult task.
The evidence-based medicine movement can provide us some
inspiration as we try to develop methods of determining the impact of rules
on the accuracy of legal outcomes. One important lesson we can learn from
doctors is the value of attending both to easily measurable surrogate
outcomes and also more subjective ultimate outcomes of deeper theoretic
interest, depending on the specific goals of an investigation.302 In medicine,
doctors sometimes track immediate biophysical signs, such as biopsy
results or cholesterol levels, either as indicators of broader patient health or
as interesting in their own right.303 Depending on the question of interest,
procedural investigators could similarly compare legal outcomes with
individual details of underlying cases. As discussed above, a number of
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301
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303

See discussion supra Part II.
See generally Allen, supra note 3.
See Deyo, supra note 69, at 70–71.
See STRAUS ET AL., supra note 122, at 72–73.

82

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:25

investigations into the accuracy of medical malpractice litigation outcomes
have proceeded in this way, comparing the outcomes of claims with expert
determinations of whether medical errors occurred.304 These studies have
given unique insight into this realm of litigation, enabling us to get rough
estimates as to how often settlements are given to both deserving and
undeserving claimants, as well as how often culpable doctors avoid legal
judgments against them.305
One lesson from the evidence-based medicine movement, however, is
that such intermediate measurement can lead to systematic errors, given that
factors like blood pressure are imperfect predictors of overall health.306 The
modern trend in evidence-based medicine is towards looking at more
ultimate indicators of health, like changes in overall mortality or morbidity
on longer time scales, rather than immediate biophysical signs.307
Unfortunately, the factual accuracy of case outcomes is harder to
measure than whether a patient lives or dies. It may be valuable to know
how brute facts like who prevails or how much they win correlate with
various underlying case facts, but such correlations will ultimately allow
only a blurry estimate of the deeper idea of adjudicative accuracy. As
discussed above,308 one of the most critical quantities of interest for
procedural design would be a measure of the correspondence between the
factual understanding that motivated the legal result in a case and the actual
set of historical facts that gave rise to the litigation. Such a comparison
would isolate the component of the decision that is primarily about the facts
that are being disputed from the legal doctrines, personal preferences, and
moral judgments that help decision makers translate facts into outcomes.
And while qualitative descriptions of similarities and differences would be
interesting, more useful for the purposes of measuring the impact of
possible rules on overall accuracy would be a single accuracy score that can
be compared between many different types of case outcomes and subject
matters under dispute. Thus, the product of accuracy measurement, in an
ideal world, would be a single value that incorporates both the number of
factual disagreements between the motivating and actual facts, as well as
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See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 268, at 1963–64; Cheney et al., supra note 268, at 1599;
Farber & White, supra note 268, at 795; Studdert et al., supra note 268, at 2024.
305
See, e.g., Studdert et al, supra note 268, at 2028 (finding that, in about a quarter of malpractice
cases, the availability of a settlement did not correlate with whether medical error had occurred).
306
See discussion supra Part II.D.
307
See Deyo, supra note 69, at 70–71.
308
See discussion supra Part III.
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some indication of the relative importance of those facts to the decision
maker.309
In the search for an objective method for evaluating procedural success,
we are quickly confronted with the reality that the very concept of accuracy
depends on both the subjective motivations of a legal decision maker and
the qualitative judgment of a reviewer or group of reviewers. Despite what
some readers may think, however, this is not fatal to the overall project of
measuring adjudicative accuracy. Measuring overall patient health or pain
levels involves a great deal of subjectivity, but tracking such data is
extremely important if you wish to make real people healthier rather than
just optimize various test results.310 And in some cases, medical
measurement properly incorporates even greater amounts of subjectivity.
Rates of psychiatric disease, for example, are grounded in individual
clinical comparisons of a patient’s mental and social functioning with a
range of behavior that is defined to be aberrant.311 So long as the target of
measurement is a quantity of important theoretic interest and the
measurement process has an acceptable rate of reliability, subjectivity in
coding measurements need not be fatal to the goals of accuracy tracking.312
A second challenge looms: Where do we get data concerning the
motivating factual understanding and the historic factual reality? For some
litigation outcomes, the motivating factual understanding may be fairly
transparent. Judicial decisions, for instance, will often be supported by a
written elaboration of both the facts as understood by the court and the
reasons for the overall decision.313 So long as there are sufficiently strong
norms of sincerity and candor in the articulation of these facts and
reasons,314 such writings might provide an acceptable source of data as to
the motivating factual understanding underlying a given outcome. But
many other methods of resolving cases leave no paper trail. Settlements are
often kept secret and are usually unaccompanied by an explanation of the

309
In such a system, a “10 out of 10” might indicate that the original decision maker and the
evaluator agreed on all of the facts that were important to the result, while a “0 out of 10” would indicate
total disagreement. Most results, of course, would be intermediate values that represent partial, rather
than total, agreement.
310
See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts Continue to Rely
on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1028–31 (2002).
311
See id. (describing the behavioral qualities that modern-day psychiatrists use to delimit mental
illness).
312
See Deyo, supra note 69, at 66.
313
See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 52(a).
314
See generally Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008) (defining and
discussing the norms of judicial sincerity and candor).
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lawyers’ view of the case, in part due to practice conventions and in part
due to professional confidentiality obligations.315 Jury verdicts (in the
absence of special verdict forms) are shrouded in mystery.316 And
sometimes, decisions may be the product of negotiation among parties with
differing factual understandings, so that no one mind can be said to possess
the full set of factual understandings that “motivate” the overall result.
These obstacles make it harder to implement systematic measurement
of case outcome accuracy, but they do not make it impossible. Parties
could be asked to voluntarily permit their lawyers to describe and disclose
their view of cases as part of research programs, and jurors could similarly
be asked to articulate their views of the case after a trial is concluded. If
voluntary rates of participation were high enough, acceptably valid and
reliable data might be collected. But herein lurks a problem; so long as
disclosure is voluntary, individual research efforts might always be
frustrated by holdouts who refuse to disclose relevant information, and we
will never be able to know with confidence whether the data of those who
voluntarily disclose is representative of the set of people who refuse. A
more promising approach—although a harder one to realize—would be to
amend existing procedures and professional obligations to require such
disclosures as part of the duties of lawyers and jurors, while creating a
corresponding duty of confidentiality on the part of any researchers who
gain access to such information.
So the motivational-facts component of the accuracy measure could be
systematically acquired at modest cost, provided that we are either able to
establish a norm of widespread voluntary explanations by decision makers
or else establish mandatory duties to the same effect. What, then, of the
other half of the puzzle, the historical facts? Here we have a harder
challenge, as we lack an existing mechanism, external to the legal process,
capable of providing a gold standard picture of what events truly occurred
that gave rise to the lawsuit.
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See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements,
105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2007) (noting that most settlements are confidential and that courts
almost never order disclosure of confidential settlement terms). The obstacle of lawyer confidentiality
obligations has an interesting parallel in the history of medicine. One of the great obstacles to the
introduction of scientific methods to medical practice was the longstanding opposition of European
religious organizations to the dissection of cadavers. The relaxation of this norm was a crucial
ingredient in early attempts to put traditional medical theories to the test. See discussion supra Part I.
316
See 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2505 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting that the use of special verdict forms has never been widespread in federal civil cases, although it
may be on the rise); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 62
U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1420 (1994) (noting the rarity of special verdict forms in criminal cases).
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The malpractice-litigation studies I discussed above may provide us
with the kernel of an accuracy measurement design that could be
implemented more broadly.317 Researchers in several of those studies
retained physicians to review insurance files and medical records in order to
determine whether they indicated adverse events, whether those adverse
events were caused by medical negligence, and also the degree to which the
patient suffered a disability.318 This approach has some notable strengths: It
employs subject matter experts with some expertise in the relevant domain,
and it shields them from knowledge regarding how the legal system had
resolved the claims, lessening the risk that they will be biased toward
confirming its outcomes. And it guides the reference-standard evaluators
by focusing their attention on variables of particular legal interest.
Unfortunately, with the doctors’ expertise may come a different form of
bias: because they identify with other members of their profession, doctors
may be less likely to attribute injuries to medical causes or find medical
behavior to be negligent.319 Also, having them code for a legal conclusion
(negligence) meant that the data they produced combines normative
impulses with factual assessment in a way that obstructs an attempt to focus
on the factual validity of the results. That is, it is hard to say, on the basis
of these studies, whether the “errors” involve misunderstandings of medical
information or disagreements about what sort of errors deserve
compensation. Finally, a focus on medical records or insurance files as the
sole source of independent data may itself bias the results, especially if
doctors, nurses, and insurers are reluctant to record some types of bad
behavior. By addressing these deficiencies, we might approach a form of
assessment we could justifiably claim as a gold standard for purposes of
measuring the impact of procedures on juridical accuracy.
First, if the reference-standard evaluators are aware of the outcomes of
the cases they are reviewing, then there is a risk that they will either be
biased toward confirming those results or towards labeling them as
erroneous.320 For this reason, a gold standard reference evaluation should
have full access to case files but be as blind as possible to case outcomes.
Second, we should try to provide our evaluators with as much
independent data as possible so that they do not merely replicate the
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See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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See Studdert et al., supra note 268, at 2031–32.
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See STRAUS ET AL., supra note 122, at 72 (noting that some seemingly “hard” measurement
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mistakes of the system they are studying. Crucially, this means that case
records alone may be an insufficient source of information, especially for
cases resolved early on with little discovery or investigation. Ideally,
evaluators should know all that the parties and lawyers know. In order to
approach this ideal, evaluators should be given access to full accounts of the
facts underlying the dispute from all the parties, lawyers, and witnesses,
with issues of confidentiality and privilege waived for the purposes of
investigation.
Clearly, for such a system to be effective, parties would have to have
sufficient assurance that their unvarnished and candid accounts would not
subsequently be used against them in court. A critical part of any such
assessment process is that the information obtained is kept fully private and
is never used to alter the results reached by the legal process. As a result,
we must keep secret the errors detected by such methods on an individual
basis so that we can reliably report the accuracy of the system as a whole.
There is also a difficult tension present between making evaluations
blind to actual outcomes and making them fully informed. The more
deeply evaluators probe the facts underlying a dispute, the greater the risk
that a party or other individual involved in a case will deliberately or
inadvertently reveal information regarding how the case actually turned out.
Hopefully, such concerns could be minimized if all involved understood
both the value of keeping such information from being disclosed, and also
that the evaluators’ judgment could have no effect on the outcome that had
actually been achieved.
Third, the best means of measuring accuracy will be one that separates
out those components of decision making that are factual in nature from
those that are discretionary or normative.321 Once our evaluators have
combed through the statements of parties, witnesses, lawyers, and relevant
documents, they can then prepare their own account of what most likely

321
The conflation of normative and factual accuracy is a problem that is endemic to much of the
studies that have actually attempted to measure accuracy. Of course, it may also be useful to compare a
decision maker’s understanding of relevant law (or even relevant norms) with some sort of reference
standard on these questions. Indeed, many legal questions may have answers clear enough that it may
be reasonable to refer to some outcomes as legally “accurate” and others as “inaccurate.” See Ronald J.
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1790–97
(2003) (explaining that questions of law are, at bottom, questions of fact and so may have right, wrong,
and indeterminate answers to the same extent that other factual questions do); Lawrence B. Solum, On
the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 472 (1987) (arguing that
there are many legal questions for which some answers are clearly correct and others are clearly
incorrect). Some studies along these lines might be useful; for instance, it might be instructive to see
how well attorneys engaging in early settlements understand the law that would govern their cases.
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occurred in the past giving rise to the dispute. Because this process is
aimed at assessing the legal system’s performance—rather than producing
binary outcomes between innocence and guilt or liability and nonliability—evaluators should not express certainty where none exists.
Rather, an appropriate procedure would be for the evaluator to create a
narrative in which she indicated both those facts that were clear and those
that were subject to significant uncertainty. Once the narrative statement
was complete, the evaluator could be given access to the actual decision in
the case (if that decision involves enough factual components to be
analyzable for accuracy) or to an account prepared by a decision maker of
his reasons for reaching a particular result. The evaluator could then score
that decision on a scale that allowed her to distinguish between those
resolutions that were strongly supported by the underlying facts, those that
were made on an ambiguous record, and those that ran strongly against the
most likely version of past events. Alternatively, if the research question
involves comparing some non-factual aspect of a decision (like a damages
amount) with the underlying facts of cases, the evaluator’s account can be
used as a source for identifying which cases involve the relevant facts and
which do not.
Establishing such a system would require thoughtful choices about how
we could best ensure that evaluators work hard to evaluate cases closely and
avoid bias to the extent that is humanly achievable. One important issue is
deciding whom to use as evaluators. There are many plausible options,
such as using lawyers retained on a special-master model, subject-matter
experts (as in many of the malpractice litigation studies), retired judges, or
even intelligent non-lawyers in something approximating a jury model.
Whoever is chosen, the research design would need to incorporate
periodic checking of the evaluators’ reliability. There are several tests that
could be conducted to maintain confidence in our evaluators. Those in
charge could assign multiple coders to evaluate the same cases, in order to
test measurement reliability (or how likely it is that the measurement
system would code the same case the same way in repeated encounters).322
The researchers could also personally review a sampling of their results and
the supporting evidence to get some sense of the validity of the
measurements by seeing how closely the evaluative summaries track the
supporting materials. And as a final validity check, test cases for which
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See, e.g., James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Gender and U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument
on the Roberts Court: An Empirical Examination, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 613, 625–26 (2010) (employing this
common procedure in order to ensure adequate reliability in the measuring of subjective variables).
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historical facts are reliably known could be inserted into the measurement
stream from time to time to give a further basis for coding validity analysis.
Indeed, a comparison of how reliable and valid the work of different
evaluators is would be useful not just in monitoring their performance and
incentivizing careful work, but also in making long-run decisions about
who to turn to and how much to pay for the work. It may turn out that
educated laypeople do as well or better than lawyers, in which case we
might find that a great deal of evaluation can be obtained at relatively
acceptable cost. It might also turn out that retired judges or subject matter
experts are so superior that review by anyone else cannot plausibly be
considered a gold standard against which to test litigation results. Absent
experience with such systems, further speculation as to the best choice for
reference-standard evaluators would be of little use.
Some may wish to object to any reference-standard evaluators we might
select on the grounds that, regardless of the individual merits of those
evaluators, they will operate at a disadvantage to viewers of a live oral trial,
with its special rituals of cross-examination and its opportunity to observe
witness demeanor while testifying as an aid to making credibility calls.
This concern, however, would be weaker than it initially appears. First,
most civil or criminal cases are not resolved through a trial on the merits,
but rather through a settlement or a pre-trial procedural dismissal.323 Thus,
even if we worry that an inquisitorial-style reference evaluation lacks some
reliability features associated with trials, it could still be made more
accurate than a modal case resolution, given its greater access to case
information and its lack of distortions due to cost constraints or disparities
in litigation resources between parties. Second, contrary to received
wisdom, live trials may not offer systematic accuracy advantages over
paper-based fact-finding. Although live trials offer some benefits in terms
of clarifying and simplifying complex case information, they also come at a
cost: they may decrease the accuracy of detecting insincere or mistaken
testimony, and they may also provide extra sources of appearance-driven
bias that skew case evaluations.324 Thus, there are good reasons to think
that a well-funded and well-motivated investigation by an intelligent
individual with complete access to both the facts in a case record and to
concealed confidential information would usually meet, and sometimes
exceed, the typical accuracy of the existing litigation system.
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See Spottswood, supra note 290, at 828.
See id. at 835–51.
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If we were willing to take the steps needed to establish such a system,
there is a good chance that it would substantially increase our ability to
acquire useful answers to a wide variety of procedural questions. For
instance, we could gain useful insight into long-running debates on the best
method of judicial selection by comparing the overall accuracy rates
achieved by competing methods, controlling as far as we can for other
confounding differences.325 Alternatively, we could compare different
areas of the law or different procedural regimes and see which do a better
job at understanding the facts of cases. Likewise, we could compare the
accuracy of resolutions at different stages in the lives of cases, and learn if
pretrial decisions broadly correspond with the results in factually similar
cases that go to trial, or if settlement amounts vary appropriately depending
on the factual strength of the underlying case. Finally, we could use such
measurement as a basis for truly evidence-based design of judicial
procedures by conducting either randomized experiments or well-designed
observational studies that assess the impacts of different procedural rule
alternatives on the overall accuracy of the factual understandings that
produce case outcomes, combined with assessments of the perceived
fairness, cost, and time-to-decision of those procedures.326 With such data
in hand, we could make informed procedural policy decisions when we try
and balance among these variables rather than relying on our (often wrong)
intuitions about the ways that different rule regimes will play out in
practice.
Consider a concrete example already discussed at some length above:
the right-to-counsel debate.327 Armed with tools described above, we could
answer the question that is most important in these debates, but which even
the most sophisticated, randomized experiments have been unable to probe.
Imagine that we have identified an area in which appointed counsel does
seem to improve their client’s chances of prevailing, perhaps by means of a
randomized experiment. This might be good or bad news: perhaps the
lawyers are helping people with bad claims or defenses confuse judges and
win what they are not entitled to through perjury and fancy lawyering.328

325
Cf. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 128–39
(2009); PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 27–28 (1980); Mary L. Volcansek, Judicial Elections and American Exceptionalism:
A Comparative Perspective, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 817–19 (2011).
326
See Posner, supra note 144, at 374–77; Walker, supra note 144, at 67–68.
327
See discussion supra Part III.
328
Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and
the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 299–317 (1998) (describing the tactics
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Conversely, perhaps appointed lawyers are helping people with good claims
but low advocacy skills obtain results that they deserve.329 An assessment
of the validity of the factual understandings of the relevant decision makers
could provide a useful partial answer, telling us whether the lawyers were
improving success by increasing rates of confusion or by better educating
judges. If a random experiment was combined with a measure of the degree
to which decision makers’ justifications for their decisions corresponded
with the results of gold standard independent evaluations, we might be able
to get a better grasp on whether, in a given type of case, appointing counsel
provides a general social benefit or merely a narrow parochial benefit for
their clients.
Similarly, such an approach could shed valuable light on the
Twombly/Iqbal debate. Recall that the question of true theoretical interest
is whether the heightened pleading standard propounded by the Supreme
Court successfully weeds out frivolous claims before discovery while
allowing most non-frivolous claims to proceed.330
An accuracymeasurement design could be useful, in the first instance, by providing
descriptive statistics about how well judges do at understanding the
underlying facts of cases at the motion-to-dismiss phase of a case. This
alone could be valuable information, but we could learn much more if we
conducted a controlled experimental trial comparing different pleadingreview approaches. By randomly assigning some cases to a Twombly/Iqbal
standard and some to the pre-existing regime, tracking them to completion,
and comparing the overall accuracy of all results, we could learn whether
the new standard raises or lowers the accuracy of the outcomes in cases it
applies to. This might not tell us all we would wish to know about these
cases; even if the new regime tends to be more accurate on average, it might
be objectionable if, for instance, it tended to deter some claims by
meritorious plaintiffs from being filed.331 But knowing whether or not the
that enabled the O.J. Simpson defense team to obtain an acquittal).
329
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
330
See discussion supra Part III.B.
331
It might be possible to detect such an effect by tracking incidents of injury and seeing how many
result in a filed complaint under either set of rules. See, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between
Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 248 (1991)
(finding that out of 280 incidents involving medical negligence—as defined by a medical review
panel—only 8 patients filed malpractice claims). But conducting a true experiment along these lines
would most likely involve difficult trade-offs. On the one hand, there is a need to implement
experimental and control procedures on a geographically widespread and long-term basis in order to
allow enough information about the consequences of rules to percolate down into the decision making
processes of potential plaintiffs. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 144, at 978. On the other, there is a
need to avoid confounding effects from other causes that might influence accuracy over long time
scales, as well as the effects of forum-shopping by plaintiffs who have been geographically “assigned”
to one condition but can pragmatically elect to use a different one. And of course, realistically detecting

2012]

Evidence-Based Litigation Reform

91

Supreme Court’s basic intuition regarding the value of plausibility
screening is correct would be enormously helpful in deciding whether its
new standard should be preserved or uprooted.
Having suggested that such an institution might be possible and very
useful, I must emphasize that it cannot be a panacea for all juridical ills.
For one thing, data collection of this sort, that works to generate simple
measures that can compare widely different types of cases, can be very
useful for testing hypotheses, but it will not do the hard work of generating
them. Designing good research on the causal effects of procedure will
require not just powerful means of comparing outcomes, but also a steady
increase in our understandings of how procedural systems function at a
theoretic level. To go back to the medical parallel, we would not do nearly
as well if we had an extensive drug testing process but no knowledge of the
internal composition of the human body. Indeed, historically a great deal of
the early progress in making medicine a more scientific enterprise arose not
from widespread experimentation comparing therapies and controls, but
rather from the new availability of cadavers for dissection and an increased
attention to nuanced evaluation of patient symptoms.332 In the litigation
realm, this translates into a need for a combined approach, where theories
are developed based on close and sophisticated observation of cases,
preferably with maximal access to private information, as well as through
controlled experiments in artificial scenarios, and then tested in larger, realworld samples with appropriate controls for confounding variables and
measurement of effects. If we are to achieve long-run optimization of
procedural systems, theory and empirical analysis will have to walk handin-hand.
Ultimately we will need more than just promising theories and a design
that enables us to test them; we will also need money. Perhaps the reason
that a system along these lines has never been tried is that conducting an
investigation into the accuracy of competing procedural regimes requires
resources well beyond what juridical policy scholars normally spend.
Indeed, the very nature of crafting a gold standard investigation
contemplates that some case measurements will cost more than was spent
on the original litigation.333 If the judicial process has compiled a less-thancomplete record, the reference-standard evaluator will need to expend more
resources independently investigating the dispute.
all the sources of injury that might lead to a lawsuit and keeping track of whether they do, in fact,
produce one is a task of near-Sisyphean magnitude. As a result, it may be extremely difficult to
meaningfully measure the impact of differing rules on potential plaintiffs’ willingness to sue.
332
See discussion supra Part II.B.
333
This is most likely to be the case in low-cost administrative settings or when evaluating case
outcomes that arise through very early settlements or pleading dismissals.
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The cost barrier is probably the biggest obstacle towards conducting
this sort of research, but it might be surmountable. Note that in some
settings, such as the approval of new pharmaceutical drugs, we are willing
to bear quite high costs to be sure that our interventions are better than the
status quo. As discussed above, our society expends hundreds of millions
of dollars in evaluation costs for each new pharmaceutical drug we allow to
be marketed.334 We are willing, in other words, to spend lots of money to
ensure that medical treatments are effective at improving our health,
perhaps in part due to the high costs of treating serious diseases
ineffectively.
Perhaps reformers could similarly mobilize political decision makers to
invest in accuracy tracking by relying on the dramatic string of DNA-based
exonerations of serious felony convictions.335 Indeed, one special point of
leverage that reformers might employ is that policy makers will likely
expect the results of such studies to confirm their pre-existing views
regarding good procedural policy.336 Thus, even though many studies may
reach conclusions that undermine the preferred policies of legislators or rule
makers, they may be willing to support them because, ex ante, most of them
will expect such investigations to provide support.
Moreover, we need not, and should not, collect so much data about all
of the cases in our court systems at any one time. One way to keep costs
down is to focus on those adjudicative settings or questions that are
particularly worrying, and do targeted studies that are large enough to
obtain relevant data, but not so large that the costs become
overwhelming.337 For instance, if we are very concerned (as some are)338
about the quality of the decision making in immigration courts, we could
embark on a research project comparing the factual judgments of
Immigration Judges (“IJs”) with those of independent evaluators given
access to case data, the applicants, and appropriate country information.

334
See DiMasi et al., supra note 109, at 180 (estimating an average out-of-pocket cost of $403
million per new drug brought to new market, with a total capitalized cost of $802 million). Although
drug companies will often be able to recapture these costs by bringing valuable new products to market,
the legal system does not operate as a for-profit enterprise and thus it is likely that similar research
would require significant governmental or private funding sources.
335
See generally GARRETT, supra note 16, at 1–13.
336
See Abramowicz et al., supra note 144, at 985.
337
See id. at 962.
338
See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (“In the year
ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this court reversed the Board of Immigration
Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of . . . petitions . . . that were resolved on the
merits.”).
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This could be used both to get descriptive statistics on how well IJs are
doing in general on this measure, and also to test the efficacy of specific
reforms via either random assignment, if possible and politically feasible, or
a second-best solution using some sort of statistical control technique and
observational data.
Similarly, if we are particularly concerned about the impact of
discovery costs on civil litigation and think that some new procedure might
improve on the status quo, we could conduct a targeted experiment
comparing the new and old rules in a few select jurisdictions, evaluating the
impact of the new rule not just on legal costs but also on legal accuracy.
Thus, we would be able to distinguish reforms that cut costs or delay in a
beneficial way from those that trim away cost by dispensing with justice.
Over the long term, such investigations might save far more social costs
than they generate.
Of course, if we found such an approach helpful with respect to discrete
questions, we might want to implement a broader system of monitoring that
would enable many different research questions to be answered over time,
and enable inter-system and inter-temporal comparisons of many kinds.
Coupled with a regulatory regime that required randomized experimental
trials of new rules and publication of data regarding the differential impacts
of those proposals on the cost, time-to-completion, perceived fairness, and
factual accuracy of case resolutions, we might truly be able to embark on a
project of evidence-based procedure reform. For that to work, however, we
would need a means of keeping costs to a manageable level.
One method of keeping costs down, while still generating data that may
allow reasonably accurate inferences regarding an overall system, is
randomly selecting a small percentage of cases in the system to be
measured. For instance, we almost certainly could not find money in the
federal budget to pay for systematic accuracy measurement over all federal
civil cases, but it might be feasible to randomly choose 3,000 (out of a total
of around 300,000) cases to be evaluated and coded each year.339 That
might still allow large enough sub-samples of case subject matters and
resolution-types to permit a great deal of useful data gathering, and if finergrained analysis was needed, cases could be gathered over a multi-year time
frame into a larger sample.

339
See Posner, supra note 144, at 375; U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS 2011 TABLE C (2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStat
istics/2011/tables/C00Mar11.pdf (indicating that 285,603 civil cases were terminated by the federal
courts in 2010, and that 324,190 were terminated in 2011).
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Finally, we must also be realistic about what even a well-funded system
of measurement along these lines is capable of achieving. Even given an
elaborate accuracy-measurement system, there are some theories that will
be beyond our capability to test. One central problem is that litigation rules
do not only affect litigation conduct; they also affect out-of-court behavior
and a party’s choice of forum in which to file claims. So if one effect of
legal rules is to deter filing of claims or shunt them into a different court
system, a system that tracks factors like the cost, time-to-resolution, and
accuracy of legal dispositions within that system will miss such an effect.
The results could be very misleading data; if a new rule makes certain
meritorious claims very hard to prove, it might lower the rate at which
factually supportable claims are brought successfully even while the subset
of claims actually filed stays the same.340 This is not a failure of such a
research design—no tool can answer any possible question—but it is an
important limitation. Absent protocols that can follow large quantities of
out-of-court behavior as well as the litigation process itself,341 we will be
limited to exploring questions that ask what effects procedural rules have on
litigation behavior alone, which may not always be what rule designers
would wish to know in a perfect informational world.342
So an evidence-based movement in procedural design probably is
achievable, but would require shifts in confidentiality norms, new reporting
obligations for many legal actors, and a willingness to absorb significant
new costs. Should reformers band together to push for such large changes
to the way we evaluate procedural success and failure? In the end, it
depends on a number of factors and admits of no easy answers. For those
who, like me, think we have little warrant for believing that our system is
fairly accurate on average and think that accuracy is one of the most
important qualities that a litigation system can possess, the proposal may be
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See Localio et al., supra note 331, at 247–48.
See discussion supra Part V.
342
One potential means of filling this gap might involve careful, cross-jurisdictional matching
studies designed to closely approximate a controlled experiment. Such a design would involve two key
elements. First, it would be necessary to have a way of sampling the frequency of law violations in a
particular context. See e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 268, at 1964 (sampling from medical case files to
detect base rates of adverse medical events caused by negligence, and comparing such base rates with
rates of filed claims). Second, variations in claiming rates due to variations in procedural or evidentiary
rules might be detected through careful regression or matching analyses that aim to isolate the effect of
the procedures from potential confounding covariance. Such analysis will necessarily leave more
uncertainty on the table than a true experiment, but it is probably the only viable means of obtaining data
on these questions, given the implausibility of randomly assigning individuals to differing rule regimes
long before they have reason to sue or defend against a claim.
341
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attractive. Others may doubt either of those two propositions, and so will
be unwilling to bear the large transitional costs involved in creating a truly
evidence-based litigation-design movement.
VI. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS AN ACCURACY MEASUREMENT CULTURE
Given that the large transformation I describe is hard to envision and
that many will be reluctant to bear its costs, some readers may wonder
whether the discussion above has any relevance for real-world litigation
research and practice. Luckily, a focus on what a strong evidence-based
litigation reform movement might involve also provides clues as to ways
we can modestly improve existing methods of assessing, designing, and
implementing procedural rules.
First, whether or not a large-scale program of validity evaluation for
legal outcomes is implemented, procedural analysts can benefit from
thinking about the gulf between those things that are typically measured in
empirical studies about litigation rules and the factors of deepest relevance
for evaluating rule optimality. One implication of this discussion is that we
should be very cautious in drawing normative conclusions about the
desirability of procedural options based on experiments and statistical data
that only measure part of the relevant values. So long as studies are
confined to describing who benefits from rules, how long it takes for cases
to be resolved, and how much parties spend in the process, we may learn
much about which interest groups stand to benefit from differing rule
regimes, but we will know little about the broader social desirability of such
regimes. Choosing to advocate for reforms that benefit some classes of
litigants more than others without any assessment of the factual merits of
their cases amounts to either political rhetoric or fairly shallow policy
analysis. Some plaintiffs who lose deserve to win, others who win deserve
to lose, and any policy reform suggestion that does not treat the two
distinctly has little to recommend it.
To be sure, the factual-validity measurement protocol I describe above
could never fully capture “who deserves to win,” because in some cases the
answer to that question will require normative and political judgment that
lies beyond the limits of empirical analysis. But often in litigation, there
would be broad agreement on a social level about who deserves to win and
who to lose if only we could identify which claims were factually
supportable and which were not. Until legal empirical research can find
ways of tackling such questions, we must treat empirically derived
recommendations in favor of particular procedural regimes with a large
grain of salt.
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Luckily, for those who are interested in conducting empirical research
and who are sensitive to the critique above, there will be an abundance of
research questions that can be delved into at relatively modest cost using
the methods I have described. Tracking data that integrates cost, fairness,
and validity data for all types of resolutions in the civil justice system will
be hard, but smaller, more manageable projects might focus on simpler
settings, such as administrative court systems or small arbitrations. In such
arenas, the variety of legal issues and methods of case resolution will likely
be smaller, as will the amount of relevant information needed for
independent analysis of the underlying facts.
For questions of pressing interest about the formal court system, grant
funding might enable localized research that incorporates validity
assessment into a study design, although in the absence of broader reforms
such studies will face challenges gaining voluntary access to sufficient data
given existing confidentiality obligations. And some such projects may be
made even more feasible if the research question of interest does not require
a type of analysis that is sensitive to all of the different ways that a case
might be resolved. For instance, imagine a rule changing the manner in
which evidence is presented to juries. Assessing the true overall effect of
such a rule would require a design that could capture the ways that earlier
litigation behavior changes in response to it, but a critic might still find it
useful to demonstrate that jury verdicts employing the new rule are, on
average, less factually accurate than verdicts employing the status-quo
control.343 Such studies might profitably be conducted using relatively
small samples of cases, and could therefore be much more affordable than
the type of systematic monitoring I sketched above.
Judges can also aid in the development of more informed procedural
design by treating the goal of making data available as among the
considerations that guide their choices. For instance, even though existing
randomized procedural trials have important limits, they still tell us much
more than the alternative of poorly controlled observational studies. When
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Such an investigation may work better for certain types of evidence rules than others. One can
imagine, for instance, that expert evaluations of the validity of verdicts could tell us a great deal about
the comparative usefulness of two different types of scientific-evidence rules. By contrast, it is hard to
see how we could justifiably investigate the utility of prejudice-based exclusions just by comparing the
results of a system employing such methods to a fully informed reference-standard evaluation. A critic
of such a study could justifiably worry that, if prejudice reduces verdict accuracy, fully informed
investigators are just as likely to suffer from it as juries. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780–84 (2001) (presenting evidence that professional judges, just like
jurors, fall prey to cognitive errors and biases).

2012]

Evidence-Based Litigation Reform

97

acting as local rule makers, judges can aid in the production of data by
adopting new rules in full only after testing them in a randomized fashion
while encouraging litigants to consent to measurement efforts.344
Moreover, judges can also help researchers accumulate data merely by
staying out of the way. One significant problem in assessing the current
landscape of procedural rules in America is that many procedural practices
have been constitutionalized.345 As I discussed above, the literature on
Civil Gideon shows that it is harder than one might initially expect to
conclude that providing counsel to the indigent is a benefit in all types of
cases.346 Yet, because of Gideon itself, we may never be able to know
whether the right to appointed criminal counsel is more clearly beneficial
than the civil versions that have been studied experimentally. Grounding a
procedural rule in the federal Constitution makes it much harder to know
whether that rule is actually worthwhile. That does not mean that there will
never be cases where the benefits of a rule are so clear that no one can see a
need for future data,347 but it does mean that the standard of evidence we
demand before adopting new constitutional procedural rules should be
particularly high.
A few further points may be useful to both judges and rule makers.
One of the things that makes it very hard to tell how procedural rules
impact adjudicative accuracy is the problem of hidden factual information.
Judges, and those who read the opinions of judges to learn about the
system’s functioning, get only a limited window into the true spectrum of
information about cases, especially the vast majority that are resolved
during the pretrial process. Lawyers and parties probably know much
more, including facts that were never disclosed during the litigation.
Because of this, practicing litigators may have a more finely tuned sense for
how often the process reaches a result that rests on dubious factual
assumptions than judges or outside observers do. This may mean that those
methods of making rules that draw more heavily on the input of practicing
lawyers may have advantages over those that rely mostly on the work of
judges. Lawyers, of course, may be biased in favor of rules that may aid
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See Tobias, supra note 144, at 1324–25 (urging a reform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to make such experimentation easier).
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See e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
346
See Barton, supra note 224, at 1232–33.
347
Cf. Abramowicz et al., supra note 144, at 973 (advising that “[w]e should not allow randomized
tests of parachutes because we already have strong evidence that they are effective” and that similar
principles apply whenever we have no need to collect data in order to choose intelligently between
policies).
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client bases with whom they have a special relationship; any such input,
therefore, would need to balance the input of differing segments of the bar.
This observation, therefore, is one reason to favor procedural rules
generated by the federal rule making process, which does incorporate
lawyer input from a wide segment of practice areas, over rules that are
purely judge-made.
Lastly, this discussion generates one final caution for rule makers.
Some scholars have recently suggested that our government institutions
should develop systematic policies requiring that new rules be
experimentally tested before they can be implemented.348 In theory, such an
approach could have many benefits. However, the value of an experimental
protocol will always depend on the usefulness of the questions it can ask. It
would be a grave mistake, therefore, to choose procedural rules by running
experiments that show their impacts on factors like cost with no means of
validating outcome quality. Until we attempt to measure the impact of our
procedures on the accuracy of case outcomes, experiments can tell us who
will benefit from new rules and how much those new rules will cost, but not
whether the changes are improving or worsening the quality of the justice
provided by our institutions. Data of that sort may do more harm than good
in the procedural policy making arena.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even after centuries, the medical profession still wrestles to
systematically condition its policies and choices on evidence. Nevertheless,
few can deny that the combination of careful investigation and theorizing
about disease in the human body, coupled with an increased willingness to
demand that interventions be experimentally validated before they are
implemented, has resulted in an astonishing increase in the effectiveness of
medical treatments compared with what prevailed a few hundred years ago.
If those who shape litigation environments wish to imitate the successes
of medicine, they will operate with some advantages: litigation is a social
process, not a biochemical one, and the ease of observing its operations
means that it will be easier to devise plausible theories about how it works
than it was to develop useful biomedical ideas. But when it comes to
testing those theories, lawyers operate at a disadvantage: the health of a
human body can be measured in numerous ways, some of which cost very
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See id. at 1005.
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little, but we will face large challenges if we commit ourselves to measuring
the accuracy of legal results.
The approach I sketched out in this Article, which attempts to separate
out the factual accuracy component of case outcomes and systematically
compare it with an independent, gold standard reference evaluation, would
be costly to implement but potentially very powerful. It could answer many
questions about the efficacy and optimality of competing procedural rules
that are presently inaccessible to either observational or experimental
testing. Nevertheless, developing a culture willing to provide the rule
structure and financial support necessary for large scale accuracy testing
may be beyond our reach, especially if most lawyers and law scholars
believe that they can trust the procedural systems that we currently employ
without testing their validity.
Continuing to gamble on the optimality of existing procedures seems
untenable given the large downsides of being wrong, which include the
human misery of the wrongfully convicted, the financial and emotional
harms of imposing inappropriate liability on innocent parties, the injustice
suffered by those who deserve social benefits but are denied them, and the
social waste perpetrated by those who successfully claim benefits they
should not receive. It is a near certainty that all of these forms of injustice
happen nearly every day in our society, but they are mostly hidden from our
view, in part because the public credibility of those who dispute a result
blessed by the legal system is extraordinarily low. Whether we can develop
an evidence-based litigation reform movement depends largely on how
much we are willing to pay to reduce such uncertain, but potentially grave,
harms.

